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In tie past two years, four related events have sharpened debates on race in the
U.S.: President Obama's election, the nomination of Judge Sonia Sotoinayor to
the Supreme Court, that Court's ruling in Ricci v. DeStefano, and the arrest of
Obauia's friend, Harvard professor Henry Gates. The President has spoken f a
"teacling moment" arising from these events. Moreover, his writings, speeches and
lawnmaking efforts illustrate the contractual nature of Obama's thinking. The
President (and all concerned citizens) should thus find useful an analysis of racial
policy and justice in light of the work ofJohn Rauls.
Rawls may be the most infuential political theorist of our time. Applying his theory
to questions of race policy, this Article defends the following comnterintuitive thesis:
while strong forms of affirmative action cannot be derived from Rawls's theory,
strorg forms of legislative reparations can be so derived. This Article concludes with
a concrete plan for raising the resources such reparations would require.
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[C]ircumstances change, and objectives that seem unreachable today may
become practical tomorrow.'
But race is an issue I believe this nation cannot afford to ignore right now.
INTRODUCTION
In the past two years, four related events have sharpened debates
on race in the U.S.: (1) President Obama's election, (2) his nomination
of Sonia Sotornayor to the Supreme Court, (3) that Court's ruling in
Ricci v. DeStefano,3 and (4) the arrest of Obama's friend, Harvard
professor Henry Gates.4 Some have hailed Obama's election as the
end of racial identity politics in the United States,' yet the fallout
from Sotomayor's nomination," the Ricci decision,' and Gates's
1. David Lyons, CorrectiveJustice, Equal Opportunity, and the Legacy of Slavery and Jin
Crow, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1375, 1403-04 (2004).
2. President Barack Obama, A More Perfect Union, Address at the Constitution
Center in Philadelphia, PA, in N.Y TIMES, Mar. 18, 2008, available at http://
www.nytinmes.com/2008/03/18/us/politics/18text-obama.htnil?ref=politics.
3. In Ricci, 129 S. Ct. 2658 (2009), the Supreme Court held that the City of New
Haven violated the rights of firefighters underTitleVII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act when it
threw out an exam on which they had scored well enough for promotion on the basis that
no Blacks and only one Hispanic had done the same. In so doing, the Court overruled a
lower court opinion joined by present Justice Sotomayor, adding a unique, interesting di-
mension to her nomination and confirmation hearings. See article cited ifra note 7.
4. Abby Goodnough, Harvard Professor Jailed; Officer is Accused of Bias, N.Y. TIMES,
July 21,2009, at A13.
5. See, e.g.,John H. Bunzel, Eliminate the Civil Rights Conlnission, S.F. CHRON.,Jan.
25, 2009, available at http://articles.sfgate.com/2009-01-25/opinion/1
7 19 7 181 1_civil-
rights-coninsission-politics-today-s-Black-leaders; Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Messiah Myth,
TIME, Nov. 24, 2008, at 33;Joe Klein, Passinq the Torc, TIME, Nov. 17, 2008, at 26; Eugene
Robinson, The Irrelevance of Race, S.E CHRON., Apr. 3, 2009, at A17; Juan Williams, What
Obatna's Victory Means for Racial Politics, WALL ST.J., Nov. 10, 2008, at A19.
6. See, e.g., Ross Douthat, Op-Ed, Race in 2028, N.Y TIMES, July 20, 2009, at A19;
Editorial, The Sototnayor Nomination, N.Y. TiMEs,July 21, 2009, at A20; Frank R-ich, Op-Ed,
They Got Sone 'Splainin to Do, N.Y. TIMES, July 19, 2009, at 10. See also Jeffrey Rosen, The
Case Against Sotornayor, THE NEW REPUBLIC, May 4, 2009, available at http://
www.tnr.coni; Shelby Steele, Op-Ed, Sotoanayor and the Politics of Race, WALL ST. J., June 9,
2009, at A14.
Beyond the questions Judge Sotomayor had to answer about her vote in Ricci, sev-
eral on the Senate Judiciary Committee asked her to explain what has become known as
her "wise Latina woman" remark: "I would hope that a wise Latina woman with the rich-
ness of her experiences would more often than not reach a better conclusion than a white
male who hasn't lived that life." See Sonia Sotomayor, A Latina Judge's Voice, Address at the
University of California, Berkeley, School of Law, in N.Y. TIMES, May 15, 2009, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/15/us/politics/ I 5j udge.text.html?re f=us.
7. See, e.g., Editorial, A Flawed Test Case, S.F CHRO .,June 30, 2008, at A8; Editorial,
Court Turns a Blind Eye, PHILA. ENQUIRER,June 30, 2009, at A1O; Editorial, FirefighterJustice,
WALL ST. J., June 30, 2009, at A14; Editorial, The Ricci Ruling's Real Message, CHRISTIAN
SCIENCE MoNIToR,June 30, 2009, at 8 ("The battling Ricci opinions show just how much
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arrest" remind us that those politics remain at the forefront of the na-
tional psyche.
In Ricci, of course, the judges settled the niatter.Yet at least on paper,
the U.S. is still a republic, in which the political branches of government
are the prime movers of policy change through law. Commenting on
Ricci, the Christian Science Monitor observed that
America's unsettled debate over race has too often been conducted be-
tween judges writing alone in their chambers rather than in open forums by
the public or their elected representatives. . . . [S]uch questions should not
be only for justices to decide .... The emotions of race are best left to pub-
lic forums and for elected bodies to resolve."
As Jeffrey Rosen adds, Ricci is among recent Supreme Court rul-
ings' that "may force Barack Obama to do what he has the unique skills
but not the political incentive to do at the moment: carve out a third way
in the race debate, one that rejects the extremes of conservative color-
blindness and liberal racialism.'""
The President, as it happens, has thought deeply about race. An ill-
chosen comment on the Gates arrest aside,' 2 Obarna's writings, speeches,
and lawmaking efforts show an ability to transcend difference and to
articulate a third way, or higher synthesis, on such matters. These sources
also show the contractual nature of Obama's thinking-his deep belief that
civil society and constitutional democracy depend upon a strong social
contract between government and the individual as well as among racial
Americans have yet to reconcile the need to reduce achievement gaps for Blacks and His-
panics with actions that border on racial discrimination against whites, as was the case in
Ricci."); Firefighters and Race, N.Y. TMES, July 1,2009, at A32; Linda Greenhouse, Op-Ed,
The Court Changes the Gamie, N.Y.TIMES,June 30, 2009, at A21 ;James Oliphant, Race Rid-
ing Fuels Critics of Sotoinayor, L.A.TiMES,June 30, 2009, at A 11.
8. See, e.g., Peter Baker & Helene Cooper, President Tries to Defuse Debate Over Gates
Arrest, N.Y TiMES, July 25, 2009, at Al; Thomas Frank, The Gates of Political Distraction,
WALL ST. J.,July 29, 2009, at A13;Abby Goodnough, Sergeant who Arrested Professor Defends
Actions, N.Y. TMES, July 24, 2009, at A3; Glenn C. Loury, Obamia, Gates, and the American
Black Matt, N.Y TIMES, July 26, 2009, at 11; Maria Newman, Varied Opinions on Gates
Controversy Light up the Web, N.Y. TMES, July 24, 2009, available at http://
www.nytinies.com/2009/07/25/us/politics/25gatesblogs.html?ref=politics; Susan Saulny
& Robbie Brown, Professors Arrest Tests Beliefs on Racial Progress, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 2009,
at Al.
9. Editorial, Ricci Rulings Real Message, supra note 7.
10. Jeffrey Rosen, Race to the Top, THE NEW RErUBIC, Apr. 29, 2009, at 19. The
other ruling to which Rosen refers is Nw. Austin Mun. Util. Dist. No. One v. Holder, 129 S.
Ct. 2504 (2009). In that case, however, the Court avoided the issue whether a key provi-
sion of the 1965 Voting Rights Act was constitutional, disposing of the dispute on narrow
grounds. In another Voting Rights Act case last term, however, Bartlett v. Strickland, 129 S.
Ct. 1231 (2009), the Court held that only election districts in which minorities make up
at least half of the voting-age population are entitled to the protections of a part of the
Voting Rights Act that seeks to ensure and preserve minority voting power.
11. Rosen, supra note 10, at 19.
12. See Baker & Cooper, supra note 8, at 19.
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groups.3 In a 2008 speech on race in Philadelphia, Obama invoked the
bedrock norm underlying the social contract: "[i]n the end, then, what is
called for is nothing more, and nothing less, than what all the world's
great religions demand-that we do unto others as we would have them
do unto us.""
Given this view, Democratic majorities in Congress, and the "teach-
ing monlent"" created by Sotomayor's ascendancy, Ricci's resonance and
Gates's arrest, the President should find useful an analysis of racial policy
and justice in light of the work of John I-awls. RFawls may be the most
influential political theorist of our time." In his seminal work, A Theory of
13. For now, three examples will suffice. In his June 2009 speech at Cairo University,
the President called on both the Israelis and Palestinians to acknowledge the legitimacy of
each other's suffering and right to exist. President Barack Obama, Cairo Speech (June 6,
2009), available at www.asksam.com/ebooks/releases.Obania-Speeches.ask. In his January
2009 State of the Union address, Obama underscored the civic duties of 1) the young to
finish high school and find a way to contribute to society and 2) the middle aged and old
not to leave the young with a crippling national debt. President Barack Obama, State of
the Nation (Feb. 24, 2009), available at \vww.asksam.com/ebooks/releases.Obama-
Speeches.ask. Perhaps most relevant for our purposes, he called in both his March 2008
Philadelphia speech and his July 2009 NAACP Centennial speech for Blacks and Whites
both to make genuine efforts to understand and respect each other's claims. See Obama,
supra note 2; President Barack Obama, Renarks by the President to the NAACP Centen-
nial Convention (July 17, 2009), available at http://wwxv.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/
reniarks-president-naacp-centennial-convention-07 162009.
14. Obama, sipra note 2. Beyond this, as a student of FDR, Obama has an historical
sense of the social contract. As FDRZ said in 1932, in the depths of the Great Depression
and the year that Hitler came to power,
the Declaration of Independence discusses the problems of Government in
terms of a contract. Government is a relation of give and take, a contract,
perforce, if we would follow the thinking out of which it grew. Under such a
contract, rulers were accorded power, and the people consented to that
power on consideration that they be accorded certain rights. The task of
statesmanship has always been the redefinition of these rights in terms of a
changing and growing social order ..... The terms of that contract are as old
as the Republic, and as new as the new econonic order. Every man has a
right to life .... Every man has a right to his own property ... [and t]he final
tern of the high contract was for liberty and the pursuit of happiness.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Conuonwvealth Club Address (1932) in AMERICAN POLITICAL
THOUCHT 405, 411-12 (Kenneth M. Dolbeare & Michael S. Cummings, eds., 2004) (5th
ed.).
15. Baker & Cooper, supra note 8 (quoting the President).
16. Rawls has been called "the most distinguished moral and political philosopher
of our age," Martha Nussbaum, 77e Endurinig Significancc of John Rawls, THE CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC., July 20, 2001, at B7, and his theory has been described as "the now-
dominant understanding of liberalism in the academy...." Peter Berkowitz, TheAnibiuities
of Raiwlss Ifluence, 4 PERSP. ON POL., Mar. 2006, at 121. Griffin has written that "Rawls's
theory remains the best and most relevant theory of justice available," Stephen Griffin,
Reconstructing Raw'lss 7heory of Justice: Developing a Public Values Philosophy of the Constitution,
62 N.Y.U. L. REv. 715, 716 (1987), and as Sandel has observed, "[f]or us in late twentieth
century America, [Rawls's view of liberalism] is our vision, the theory most thoroughly
embodied in the practices and institutions most central to our public life." Michael J. San-
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Justice,'7 he presented a social contract theory that he termed Justice as
Fairness. For the next thirty years, Rawls refined this theory in response
to a range of critics. This culminated in Justice As Fairness: A Restatement,'
published a year before Rawls's death in 2002. Since then, his work has
spawned a vast literature, including a major symposium on Rawls and the
law.'" Much of this literature has critiqued, defended, or elaborated upon
some aspect of Rawls's theory, yet a few writers have attempted to apply
his theory to concrete policy and constitutional issues.2 As for the issue of
race, Rawls's final statement appears in a few paragraphs of Justice as Fair-
ness. Referring to Theory of.Justice, he concludes that
[T]he serious problems arising from existing discrimination and distinctions
based on ... race are not on its agenda .... This is indeed an omission in
Theory; but an omission is not as such a fault .... Justice as fairness, and
other liberal conceptions like it, would certainly be seriously defective
should they lack the resources to articulate the political values essential to
del, The Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self 12 PoL.THEORY 81, 82 (1984). As for
Rawls's major work, A THEORY OF JUSTICE,
[it] is a powerful, deep, subtle, wide-ranging, systematic work in political and
moral philosophy which has not seen its like since the writings ofJohn Stu-
art Mill, if then. It is a fountain of illuminating ideas, integrated together into
a lovely whole. Political philosophers now must either work within Rawls's
theory or explain why not.
ROBERT NoZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA 183 (Basic Books, Inc. 1974). In Solum's
words, "the only other work in the history of political philosophy to be cited at a compa-
rable rate appears to be John Locke's Second Treatise of Governient." Lawrence B. Solum,
Situating Political Liberalism, 69 CHi.-KENT L. REv. 549, 551 n.9 (1994). As Larmore writes,
the book "changed the way the idea of social justice is understood, and provided the start-
ing point for almost everything of note that has come afterward in political philosophy."
Charles Larmore, Behind the Veil, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 27, 2008, available at
http://www.tnr.com/article/books/behind-the-veil. As Talisse thus adds, Rawls's influence
has been such that he literally "changed the subject." ROBERT B. TALISSE, ON RAWLS: A
LIBERAL THEORY OF JUSTICE AND JUSTIFICATION 78 (Wadsworth 2001). Rawls might there-
fore be the Darwin, Picasso, Freud, Einstein, or Louis Armstrong of his field.
17. JOHN RAWLS, ATHEORY OFJusTiCE (Harvard Univ. Press 1999) (1971) [herein-
after, THEORY].
18. JOHN RAWLS, JUSTICE As FAIRNESS: A RESTATEMENT (Erin Kelly, ed., Harvard
Univ. Press 2001) [hereinafter, FAIRNESS].
19. Symposium, Rails antd the Law, 72 FORDHAm L. REV. 1381 (2004).
20. Within the 2004 Fordham symposium alone, scholars explored Rawls's implica-
tions for gender, judicial review, international relations, constitutionalism, torts and
property law. Symposium, supra note 19. Many of these writers were thus working at the
third of the five stages Parker identifies in "the unification of theory and practice." As he
writes, "[tihe third stage is the work of philosophically inclined lawyers who begin where
Rawls leaves off and discuss the application of his conception of social justice to particular
problems of constitutional law." Richard B. Parker, TireJurisprdential Uses of John Rau'ls,
NOMOS XX: CONSTITUTIONALISM 269, 279 (J.R. Pennock & J.W Chapman eds., N.Y.
Univ. Press 1979). 1 shall also be working at this third stage, applying Rawls to the particu-
lar constitutional (and legislative) problems of race policy.
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justify the legal and social institutions needed to secure the equality of...
minorities.'
Two related points emerge here. On the one hand, Rawls notes that
whatever else he has done, he has never systematically applied his theory
to questions of race policy. On the other, he seems optimistic that this can
be done in a way that advances racial justice. This Article argues that this
proposition is correct, yet the counterintuitive thesis it shall defend is as
follows: While strong forms of affirmative action cannot be derived from
Rawls's theory, strong forms of legislative reparations can be so derived.
This Article is thus organized as follows. Part I provides a brief over-
view of Rawls's theory ofjustice. Part II shows that this theory does not
yield strong forms of affirmative action. Part III establishes a working
definition of reparations for purposes of this Article. In part IV, after
showing that Rawlsian legislators would distinguish between
1) affirmative action and reparations as defined and 2) two domains of
public policy, this Article argues that they would reject affirmative action
yet embrace reparations," thus achieving a "third way" in federal race pol-
icy. This Article concludes by showing that with a little political courage,
and the current economic crisis notwithstanding, the President and Con-
gress could easily find the resources for reparations as defined.
I. RAWLS
Justice as Fairness is well known. A brief review will thus suffice for
our purposes. To begin, Wolff's sketch of the challenge the young Rawls
perceived is worth quoting:
the problem with which Rawls begins is the impasse in Anglo-American
ethical theory at about the beginning of the 1950's .... [Tihe major cogni-
tivist schools of ethical theory were utilitarianism and intuitionism. Each of
these traditions has strengths, from Rawls's point of view, but each also has
fatal weaknesses. Rawls revives a version of the theory of the social contract
as a way of discovering a via media between utilitarianism and intuitionism.
21. FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 66.
22. As it happens, not only has House Judiciary Committee Chairman John Con-
yers introduced reparations bills in Congress for decades, but the past few years have seen
an upsurge in interest in reparations. See, e.g., RoY L. BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVE-
NESS: A NEW MODEL FOR BLACK REPARATIONS (Univ. of Cal. Press 2004); JENNIFER
HARVEY, WHITENESS AND MORALITY: PURSUING RACIAL JUSTICE THROUGH REPARATIONS
AND SOVEREIGNTY (Dwight N. Hopkins & Linda E. Thomas eds., Palgrave Macmillan
2007); CHARLES P. HENRY, LONG OVERDUE: THE POLITICS OF RACIAL REPARATIONS (N.Y.
Univ. Press 2007); REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY: A READER (Ronald P. Salzberger & Mary C.
Turck eds., Rowman & Littlefield, Inc. 2004); REPARATIONS: INTERDISCIPLINARY INQUIRIES
Jon Miller & Rahul Kumar eds., 2007);JOHiN TORPEY, MAKING WHOLE WHAT HAS BEEN
SMASHED: ON REPARATIONS POLITICS (Harvard Univ. Press 2006); RAYMOND A. WINBUSH,




The principal strengths of utilitarianism are, first, its straightforward asser-
tion of the fundamental value of human happiness and, second, its
constructive character-its enunciation, that is to say, of a rule or procedure
by which ethical questions are to be answered and ethical disputes resolves.
A secondary merit of utilitarianism . . . is its suitability as a principle for the
settling of questions of social policy. The two most obvious weaknesses of
utilitarianism are its inability to explain how rationally self interested
pleasure-maximizers are to be led to substitute the general happiness for
their own as the object of their actions and the manifestly counterintuitive,
sometines genuinely abhorrent implications of its fundamental princi-
ple....
As a moral theory, intuitionism is methodologically inferior to utilitarian-
ism. It simply asserts, flatly and without proof, that each of us has a power
of "moral intuition" called "rational" by intuitionists but exhibiting no
structure of practical reasoning, whereby we can directly apprehend the ob-
ligatoriness of particular acts ... . But while intuitionism is weak as an
account of practical reasoning, it is strong in two respects that are clearly
important to Rawls. First, it defines the right independently of the good,
and so makes rightness a fundamental, irreducibly moral notion; second, it
takes over from Kant the doctrine of the inviolability and dignity of moral
personality and thereby decisively rejects the utilitarian tendency to view
human beings as nothing more than pleasure-containers, to be filled or
emptied like so many water jugs.21
Against this background, Rawls begins Theory by rejecting classical
utilitarianism4 and embracing Kant's moral imperative to treat the indi-
vidual person as an end in himself, not as a means to collective ends. As he
writes on the first page,
each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the wel-
fare of society as a whole can not override. For this reason justice denies
that the loss of freedom for sone is made right by a greater good shared by
others. It does not allow that the sacrifices imposed on a few are out-
weighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by many.25
Under classical utilitarianism, by contrast,
... society is rightly ordered, and therefore just, when its major institutions
are arranged so as to achieve the greatest net balance of satisfaction summed
over all the individuals belonging to it .... The striking feature of the utili-
tarian view ofjustice is that it does not matter, except indirectly, how this
sum of satisfactions is distributed among individuals .... utilitarianism does
not take seriously the distinction between persons.
2
6
23. ROBERT PAUL WOLFF, UNDERSTANDING RAWLS 11-12 (Princeton Univ. Press
1977).
24. See Samuel Freeman, Itroduction:John Rawls-An Overview, in THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION To RAWLS 1, 1 (Samuel Freeman, ed., 2002).
25. THEORY, supra note 17, at 3. See also id. at 156-59, and Rawls's rejection of the
average utility principle, id, at 139-53. Nussbaum calls this idea "simple and profound." See
Nussbaum, supra note 16, at B8.
26. THEORY, supra note 17, at 20, 23-24 (emphasis added). Rawls concedes that
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For Rawls, classical utilitarianism is "incompatible with the concep-
tion of social cooperation anong equals for mutual advantage."
2 7
lilt is customary to think of utilitarianism as individualistic, and certainly
there are good reasons for this. The utilitarians were strong defenders of lib-
erty and freedom of thought .... Yet utilitarianism is not individualistic ... in
that, by conflating all systems of desires, it applies to society the principle of
choice for one man.
Id. at 26. As he explains elsewhere,
To regard individuals as ends in themselves in the basic design of society is to
agree to forgo those gains which do not contribute to everyone's expecta-
tions. By contrast, to regard persons as means is to be prepared to impose on
those already less favored still lower prospects of life for the sake of the
higher expectations of others .... The principle of utility presumably requires
some who are less fortunate to accept even lower life prospects for the sake
of others.
Id. at 157.
Accordingly, the claim that "persons in the original position would eschew the
proposition that individuals are to be treated as individuals," Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Affirma-
tive Action and Colorblindnessfrom the Original Position, 78 TUL. L. REV. 2009, 2032 (2004),
seems misguided. Derrick Bell commits this kind of error in his critique of Parents Involved
in Comnmuity Schools v. Seattle and Meredith v.Jefferson County Public Schools, 127 S. Ct. 2738
(2007). As he writes,
It is hypocritical for Chief Justice John G. Roberts Jr. to assert that "the way
to stop discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the
basis of race." The suggestion cruelly conflates minor cures with the major
disease. Were he a medical doctor, Roberts would ban the use of vaccines
that are fashioned from the disease-causing virus.
Derrick Bell, Desqcreation's Demise, THE CIIRON. OF HIGHER EDUC.,July 13, 2007, at 11.
Bell's mistake, I submit, is to assume a moral equivalence between the individual
cells destroyed by vaccines and the individual human beings passed over due to racial pref-
erences. In no sense do, or should, those cells have the same stature, the same level of
protection, under the U.S. Constitution, as human beings.To overlook this distinction is to
embrace the organicism and collectivism at the heart of 20th century fascism.
From the outset of THEORY, by contrast, we have seen that Rawls clearly takes the
liberal distinction between persons quite seriously, for good reasons, as well as Kant's "doc-
trine of the inviolability and dignity of moral personality." The Fourteenth Amendment,
in extending equal protection to "any person," does the same. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV,
§ 1.Justice Powell thus embedded and operationalized this creation of rights in each per-
son by clarifying that racial classifications by government are subject to strict scrutiny. See
Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265,291 (1978).
The legitimacy of the principle that civil rights are held by individuals was recently
underscored in international law by hundreds of European Parliamentarians in Handan v.
Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006). As they wrote, "[olne of the principal achievements of in-
ternational law in the decades following World War Two was the widespread recognition
of individual rights and obligations ...." Brief of Amicus Curiae, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, LEGAL
ISSUEs 69 (Ethan Katsch, ed., McGraw Hill 2008)(13th ed.).
27. THEORY, supra note 17, at 13. While Rawls thus rejects utilitarianism as the core
of a viable theory ofjustice, some have argued that utilitarianism is in some ways a "natu-
ral ally" of Rawls's theory. See Samuel Scheffler, Rawls and Utilitarianiismi, ill THE CAMBRIDGE
COMPANION TO RAWLS 426, 453 (Samuel Freeman ed., 2003). Indeed, while Rawls consis-
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Accordingly, Wolff explains, Rawls's way out of the impasse between utili-
tarianism and intuitionism is the adoption of a contractual model of
authority, specifically a refinement of classical social contract theory.'8
Contracts by their nature involve a bargaining process and so, Wolff writes,
Rawls's key insight involves the bargaining game he proposes:
the brilliance of Rawls's idea lies in its promise of a way out of the impasse
to which Kant had brought moral theory.... Through the device of a bar-
gaining game, Rawls hopes to derive substantive principles .... The
constraint merely says, "You must be willing, once you have arrived at a
satisfactory principle, to commit yourselves to it for all time, no matter
what." No limits are placed on what principle shall be adopted, nor are the
players required to adopt their principle for "ethical" rather than self-
2)interested reasons.
On this foundation, Rawls erects Justice as Fairness. His architectonic
theory, on the scale of Plato's Republic, Aristotle's Politics, and Kant's Cri-
tique of Pure Reason, "is framed for a democratic society 3 and consists
of a cluster of related ideas. For the present, six of the most basic will suf-
fice: the original position, the veil of ignorance, the two principles of
justice, their lexical ordering, the basic structure, and the four stage se-
quence. Since the original position is where the "bargaining game" takes
place, this Article begins there.
In Rawls's words, the original position is "a device of representation
or, alternatively, a thought experiment for the purpose of public- and self-
clarification.0' It replaces the state of nature as the starting point for free
and equal citizens seeking to establish the rules by which their society
tently distinguishes his theory from utilitarianism in THEORY and FAIRNESS, he defends
utilitarianism elsewhere. See John Rawls, 7ivo Concepts qf Rules, in JOHN RAwLs: COL-
LECTED PAPERS 20, 21-43 (Samuel Freeman ed., Harvard Univ. Press 1999). On this point
generally, see READING RAWLS xiv (Normal Daniels ed., Basic Books Inc. 1975) and
TALISSE, supra note 16, at 24-28.
28. See, e.g.,JoHN LOCKE, Two TREATISES Or GOVERNMENT 330-49 (Peter Laslett, ed.,
Cambridge Univ. Press 1988)(1690);JEAN-JAcQUEs RoussEAu, THE SOCIAL CONTRACT 52-
54 (Roger D. Masters, ed., St. Martin's Press 1978); IMMANUEL KANT, FOUNDATIONS OF THE
METAPHYSICS Or MORALS 9-22 (Lewis Beck, ed., MacMillan 1990). By contrast to utili-
tarianism, which stresses the role of sympathy as the basis for social and political order,
Rawls writes that parties under the contract model "would reject the principle of utility
and adopt the more realistic idea of designing the social order on a principle of reciprocal
advantage." THEORY, supra note 17, at 155. A key implication Rawls derives from the nature
of contract theory is that it is the concept of "legitimate expectations," not that of moral
desert, that defines a just distributive scheme. See id. at 273-77.
29. WOLFF, supra note 23, at 20.
30. FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 39. More specifically, Rawls argues that property-
owning democracy is the regime that best satisfies the two principle of justice. See id. at
138-40. See generally Joshua Cohen, For a Democratic Society, in THE CAMBRIDGE COMPAN-
ION TO RAWLS, supra note 24, at 86-138.
31. FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 17.As Martin explains, it is "a hypothetical bargaining
situation ... , a framework or arena for a fair agreement," REX MARTIN, RAWLS AND
RIGHTS 15-16 (Univ. Press of Kansas 1985).
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will be governed. - These citizens are rational, mutually disinterested,34
and equally situated behind what Rawls terms the "veil of ignorance."-"
Behind this veil, he writes,
no one knows his place in society, his class position or social status, nor
does any one know his fortune in the distribution of natural assets and abili-
ties, his intelligence, strength and the like. I shall even assume that the
parties do not know their conceptions of the good or their special psycho-
logical propensities.
Moreover, "[t]hey also do not know persons' race and ethnic group
.... ,37 At the same time, "they know the general facts about human soci-
ety. They understand political affairs and the principles of economic
theory; they know the basis of social organization and the laws of human
psychology.38 For Rawls, the original position is an exercise in rational
choice theory.3' It posits decisionmakers with a unique combination of
ignorance and knowledge, designed to eliminate bias while providing the
broad knowledge essential for competence in choosing the principles by
which they will be governed.
32. As Rawls says, he "generalizes and carries to a higher level of abstraction the
traditional conception of the social contract." THEORY, sUpra note 17, at 3.Justice as Fairnicss
is thus rooted in contract theory, the terms of cooperation being specified by agreement,
not God's law or nature's law. See FAIRrNESS, supra note 18, at 14-15.
33. As for rationality, this "must be interpreted as far as possible in the narrow sense,
standard in economic theory, of taking the most effective means to given ends .... [Thus]
the theory ofjustice is a part ... of the theory of rational choice." THEORY, supra, note 17,
at 12-15.
34. Here, Rawls explains,"[thosel in the original position try to acknowledge prin-
ciples which advance their system of ends as far as possible. They do this by attempting to
win for thenselves the highest index of primary social goods, since this enables them to
promote their conception of the good most effectively whatever it turns out to be. The
parties do not seek to confer benefits nor to impose injuries on one another; they are not
moved by affection or rancor." Id. at 125.
35. See generally id. at 118-23.
36. Id. at 11. Rawls calls these the "natural and social contingencies." With the veil
of ignorance, it is worth noting, Rawls uses human ignorance as a tool or lever for access-
ing truth and/or justice. See generally Plato, Apolqgy, in THE LAST DAYS OF SOCRATES 37-67
(Hugh Tredennick & Harold Tarrant, trans., Penguin 1993).
37. FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 15. In this sense, their position is "ahistorical." Free-
man, supra note 24, at 11. By depriving rational, mutually disinterested individuals in the
original position of the specifics about themselves, the veil of ignorance ensures that they
are not unfairly biased in their own favor. "Rawls' idea is that, where social justice is in
question, real people should always try to choose without being biased in the direction of
their own special interests." Nussbaum, supra note 16, at B8. Further, it assures that they
will be risk averse, choosing principles for their governance, in a sense, conservatively.
RKawls illuminates the idea when he writes that "the two principles are those a person
would choose for the design of a society in which his enemy is to assign hin his place."
THEORY, supra note 17, at 132-33 (emphasis added).
38. THEORY, supra note 17, at 119.
39. THEORY, supra note 17, at 15.
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In this light, Rawls asks, "what principles of justice are most appro-
priate to specify basic rights and liberties, and to regulate social and
economic inequalities in citizens' prospects over a complete life?" ' He
answers that those in the original position would choose to be governed
by two fundamental principles, one securing equality where it is essential
(in the political and legal spheres) and the other regulating inequality
where it is inevitable (in the social and economic spheres).The first is the
"equal liberty" principle, which is Rawls's foundational constitutional
norm. It provides that "[e]ach person is to have an equal right to the most
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a similar
system of liberty for all."4 ' It is not surprising that such a principle would
emerge, for liberty is the goal of democracy while equality is its concep-
tion of justice.
In final form, the second principle provides that "[slocial and eco-
nomic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be
attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit
of the least-advantaged members of society .... ,43 The second principle is
thus actually two sub-principles: the fair equality of opportunity ("FEO")
and difference principles, respectivelyJ4 As Rawls writes, "a love of
mankind that wishes to preserve the distinction of persons, to recognize
the separateness of life and experience, will use the two principles of jus-
tice to determine its aims when the many goods it cherishes are in
opposition.
The next key idea in ,awls's theory is that the two principles are to
be "lexically ordered."That is to say, they would have
an order which requires us to satisfy the first principle in the ordering be-
fore we can move on to the second, the second before the third, and so
on. A principle does not come into play until those previous to it are fully
met or do not apply. A serial ordering avoids, then, having to balance prin-
ciples at all .... [Thus] . . . I shall propose an ordering of this kind by
ranking the principle of equal liberty prior to the principle regulating social
40. FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 41.
41. THEORY, supra note 17, at 53. As Rawls reformulates the first principle, "[e]ach
person is to have the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic
liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme of liberties for all." FAIRNESS,
supra note 18, at 42. It has been called a "variation[] on a venerable modern theme: the
harmonization of a substantial human equality with a sweeping individual freedom." Ber-
kowitz, supra note 16, at 126.
42. See ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS, (TrevorJ. Saunders, ed., Penguin Books 1981).
43. FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 42-43. On the second principle, see generally MARTIN,
supra note 31, at 64-106. Inequality is measured via an index of primary goods. See FAIR-
NESS, supra note 18, at 168-75 (reply to Sen).
44. See FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 119-34, 161-62. Let us observe here that, unlike
the equal liberty principle, the FEO and difference principles are not constitutional essen-
tials. See id. at 162.
45. THEORY, supra note 17, at 167.
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and economic inequalities. This means, in effect, that the basic structure of
society is to arrange the inequalities of wealth and authority in ways consis-
tent with the equal liberties required by the preceding principle .
In Rawls's judgment, parties in the original position would make
the basic liberties lexically prior to the second principle.They are so vital,
that is, so "nonnegotiable," that those behind the veil of ignorance would
not rationally place them at risk.
4 7
Next is the idea of the basic structure. Rawls calls this "the primary
subject of political justice,"4' and as he explains,
the basic structure of society is the way in which the main political and so-
cial institutions of society fit together into one system of social cooperation,
and the way they assign basic rights and duties and regulate the division of
advantages that arises from social cooperation over time. The political con-
stitution with an independent judiciary, the legally recognized forms of
property, and the structure of the economy (for example, as a system of
competitive markets with private property in the means of production), as
well as the family in some form, all belong to the basic structure .... The
basic structure is to secure citizens' freedom and independence, and con-
tinually to moderate tendencies that lead, over time, to greater inequalities
in social status and wealth, and in the ability to exert political influence and
to take advantage of available opportunities."
The idea of the basic structure is integral to Rawls's key distinction
between two domains of public policy, a distinction that will enable this
Article's overarching thesis.
The final stage for exploration is the four-stage sequence. Rlawls
calls this an "elaboration of the original position,"' and it is a device for
regulating the scope of lawlsian agents' knowledge at various stages of
the lawmaking process. As he writes, "[i]n the first stage, the parties adopt
the principles of justice behind a veil of ignorance. Limitations on knowl-
edge available to the parties are progressively relaxed in the next three
stages ... ,," As he elaborates,
[A]fter the parties have adopted the principles ofjustice in the original posi-
tion, they move to a constitutional convention. Here they are to decide
upon the justice of political forms and choose a constitution: they are dele-
gates, so to speak, to such a convention.... They now know the relevant
general facts about their society, that is, its natural circumstances and re-
46. Id. at 38. See also FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 43.
47. See THEORY, supra note 17, at 105. Analogous to the equal liberty principle's
lexical priority to the second principle, the FEO principle is lexically prior to the differ-
ence principle. See id. at 43.
48. FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 39.
49. Id. at 10, 159. The basic structure is related to lRawls's notion of background
justice. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALIsm 265-69 (Columbia Univ. Press 1993).
These two ideas will be especially relevant in considering reparations from a Rawlsian
perspective.
50. THEORY, szipra note 17, at 172.
51. FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 48.
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sources, its level of economic advance and political culture, and so on.
They are no longer limited to the information implicit in the circumstances
ofjustice. 2
These delegates must thus draft a political constitution within the
guidelines of the two principles, although particularly the first principle.
Having done so, they move to the third stage of the sequence, the legisla-
tive stage. Here, the veil is lifted further, and while the agents still do not
know their own identities, "the full range of social and economic facts is
brought to bear."'s This knowledge enables our agents to legislate compe-
tently within the guidelines of the Constitution they ratified at the second
stage. While the equal liberty principle is enacted into law at the constitu-
tional stage, the second principle (i.e., the FEO and difference principles
in lexical order) is enacted into law at the legislative stage. As Rawls
writes, "social and economic policies [are to be] aimed at maximizing the
long term expectations of the least advantaged under conditions of fair
equality of opportunity, subject to the equal liberties being maintained.""
At the fourth stage, the veil of ignorance is completely lifted. Here,judges,
administrators, and citizens apply the constitutional and legislative rules
chosen at earlier stages to the particular decisions they are called on to
make. "'
The four-stage sequence thus regulates the scope of Rawlsian
agents' knowledge, whether they are 1) parties in the original position, 2)
constitutional delegates, 3) legislators, or 4) administrators, judges, and
citizens. With an eye toward race policy, our constitutional delegates will
have to decide whether to incorporate an equal protection clause into the
document.Yet it will be Rawlsian legislators who choose the substance of
52. THEORY, supra note 17, at 172-73.
53. As Rawls asserts, "[tihe first principle ... covers the constitutional essentials."
FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 47. See also THEORY, supra note 17, at 174-75. As he adds, "[in
matters of constitutional essentials, as well as on questions of basic justice, we try to appeal
only to principles each citizen can endorse." FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 41. These essentials,
that is, are "those crucial matters about which, given the fact of pluralism, working politi-
cal agreement is most urgent." Id. at 46.
54. THEORY, supra note 17, at 175.
55. Id.
56. THEORY, supra note 17, at 174-75 (emphasis added). As Fullinwider explains,
what is striking about the theory is the division of labor it embraces. Its very
broadest principles of liberty and equality are themselves unable to single out
proper nicro-allocations of social benefits and burdens.This is not a defect; it
is their nature. What they can do is structure roles and institutions which
then create the social and legal machinery for assigning benefits and burdens.
Robert Fullinwider, Affirmative Action in THE STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY
Spring 2005, at 10, available at http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2005/entires/
affirmative-action.
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the civil rights laws and allocate public funds.'7 The bulk of the analysis in
Part IV will thus focus on the third stage of the sequence, where the veil
has been lifted twice and legislation addressing social and economic ine-
qualities in light of Rawls's second principle is enacted.
At the same time, an able president can sometimes spur a legislature
to action. It is therefore now useful to observe why President Obama
would likely find much of Rawls's theory persuasive. The President is a
lawyer, to begin with, steeped in the law of contracts. His view of a vi-
brant social contract as the essential foundation for political rights and
obligations in a just society is thus not surprising. While the strengths of
utilitarianism and intuitionism are plain for Obama to see, he can also
easily grasp their fatal limitations as overarching principles of justice.
Given his command of the sources and structure of American law-the
relationship among foundational principles, a constitution, statutory law
and judicial decision making--he would find the four stage sequence and
lexical ordering of the principles of justice valuable tools that invite and
enable application of those principles to concrete legal problems. As a
Democrat on the moderate political left, President Obama embraces prin-
ciples of equal liberty and fair equality of opportunity, rejecting
conservative and libertarian claims that mere formal equality of opportu-
nity yields a just and stable social order. As for the difference principle, not
only do Obama's speeches, writings and lawmaking efforts evince a genu-
ine concern for the least advantaged of all races, but also his middle class
upbringing exemplifies the fact, stressed by Rawls, that wealth and
income, not race, determine least advantaged status.
Other aspects of Justice as Fairness will be considered later in the
Article, but this overview will suffice for now. We shall now turn to con-
sider the forms of race policy that can be derived from Rawls's theory.
Accordingly, two basic forms of race policy-affirmative action and repa-
rations-are considered in the following sections.
57. Under Rawls, reparations as defined would be administered by the distributive
branch, one of four background institutions he describes. See THEORY, supra note 17, at
242-47.
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II. AFrIRMATIVE ACTION
Affirmative action is a perennially divisive issue." Compelling in-
terests and principles exist on all sides of the question. In its
constitutional domain alone, it has split the Supreme Court down the
middle for decades in such cases as UC Regents v. Bakke, "' Richmond v.
J.A. Croson,"' Adarand Constructors v. Pena,"' Grutter v. Bollinger,"2 and most
recently, Parents Involved and Meredith."3 As these cases illustrate, chal-
lenges to affirmative action programs under the U.S. Constitution are
generally brought under the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. Approaching affirmative action from a Rawlsian perspective,
the first question is whether constitutional delegates would include an
equal protection clause among their "constitutional essentials.,6 There
seems little doubt they would. As Rawls writes, "[s]ome of the ends of a
political society may be stated in a [constitution's] preamble--to establish
58. See generally THE AFFIRMATIVE ACTION DEBATE (George E. Curry, ed., Addison-
Wesley Publishing 1996); M. ALI IRAZA, A.JANELL ANDERSON, & GLYNN CUSTRED, THE UPS
AND DOWNS OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (Praeger 1999); HOWARD BALL, THE BAKKE CASE:
RACE, EDUCATION, AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (Univ. Press of Kansas 2000); CARL COHEN &
JAMES P. STERBA, AFFIRMATIVE ACTION AND RACIAL PREFERENCE: A DEBATE (Oxford Univ.
Press 2003); W ROBERT GRAY, THE FOUR FACES OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (Greenwood
Press, 2001); J. EDWARD KELLOUGH, UNDERSTANDING AFFIRMATIVE ACTION: POLITICS, DIS-
CRIMINATION, AND THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE (Georgetown Univ. Press 2006); PHILIP F.
RUBIO, A HISTORY OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION, 1619-2000 (Univ. Press of Miss. 2001); Peter
Schuck, Affirmative Action: Past, Present and Future, 20 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1 (2002);
GIRARDEAU A. SPANN, THE LAW OF AFFIRMATIVE ACTION (NewYork Univ. Press 2000).
59. 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
60. 488 U.S. 469 (1988).
61. 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
62. 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
63. 127 S. Ct. 2738 (2007). The Court consolidated these cases and heard then
together.
64. kawls writes that:
constitutional essentials ... are of two kinds: fundamental principles that
specify the general structure of government and the political process: the
powers of the legislature, executive and the judiciary; the scope of majority
rule; and equal basic rights and liberties of citizenship that legislative majori-
ties are to respect: such as the right to vote and to participate in politics,
liberty of conscience, freedom of thought and of association, as well as the
protections of the rule of law.
JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 227 (Columbia Univ. Press 1993) [hereinafter LIBER-
ALISMI. See also FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 28; Lawrence G. Sager, 7ie Constitutional
Essentials of Political Liberalism: The Why of Constitutional Essentials, 72 FORDHAM L. REV.
1421, 1430 (2004).
While our delegates would likely establish basic structural features like separation of
powers, federalism, and checks and balances, as well as Bill of Rights guarantees like the
political liberties and criminal procedure protections, an equal protection clause is a dis-
tinct matter.
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justice and to promote the general welfare-and certain constraints are
found in a bill of rights or implied in a framework of government-due
process of law and equal protection of the laws.""'
Therefore, not only would a Rawlsian constitution include an
equal protection clause, but it would also, like the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, expressly locate that right in the individual person." R1awlsian
legislators, in turn, contemplating racial categories in the law, could
scarcely resist the language of the 1964 Civil Rights Act-making it
unlawful to discriminate against "any person" based on race, ethnicity,
gender, or national origin."' As Freeman explains, "Rawls did not regard
preferential treatment as compatible with fair equality of opportunity. It
does not fit with the emphasis on individuals and individual rights,
rather than groups or group rights, that is central to liberalism.""" Tho-
mas Nagel refers to "the deviation from equality of opportunity
represented by affirmative action .... That kind of reversal of priority
between equality of opportunity and equality of results would represent
65. LIBERALISM, supra note 64, at 232 (emphasis added). On equal protection, see also
id. at 238.
The question arises whether constitutional delegates would favor a more detailed
provision, like California's Proposition 209 or Michigan's Proposition 2, which are ballot
initiatives that have been enacted into State constitutions. See Tamar Lewin, Miclian Re-
jects Affirative Actiou, and Backers Sue, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 9, 2006, at 16; see also Peter Slevin,
Court Battle Likely oii Affirmative Action; Micliigaii Voters Approved Ban, but Opponents of the
Measure Persist, WAsh. Posr, Nov. 18, 2006, at A2. The key language is: "the state shall not
discriminate against, or grant preferential treatment to, any individual or group on the basis
of race, sex, color, ethnicity, or national origin in the operation of public employment,
public education, or public contracting." CAL. CONST. Art. 1, § 31. Since Rawls says little
about federalism, he may not fully have factored the role of State constitutions as a source
of law into his theory. Some of these documents are over 100 pages long, "partak[ing] of
the prolixity of a legal code." McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819). Laws like
Proposition 209 are thus hybrids-nmore specific than an equal protection clause but less
specific than a sweeping statutory scheme like the 1964 Civil Rights Act.
This is an interesting question, yet I shall not pursue it here. Rather, I shall simply
move on to the legislative stage, where Rawlsian agents are charged with translating the
FEO and difference principles into law. Indeed, given the capacity of well drafted legisla-
tion to articulate general rules embodying rational policy, it is clear that the legislative
stage is where the questions of affirmative action and reparations under Rawls must be
engaged, rendering any consideration of a hybrid law like Proposition 209 unnecessary for
our purposes.
66. "[Njor shall any State ... deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws." U.S. CONSI. amend. XIV, § 1.
67. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000 (2009).This answers Shiffrin's legitimate concern about an
express antidiscrinination principle in Rawls's scheme. See Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Race,
Labor and the Fair Equality of Opportunity Principle, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1643, 1645 (2004).
She asks why the principle does not emerge in the original position, but overlooks the fact
that it would arise only at the constitutional and legislative stages.
68. SAmuEL FREEMAN, RAWLS (London: Routledge 2007) at 90-91. For a reluctant
admission that Kant (from whom, we have seen, Rawls derives much of his theory, includ-
ing the sanctity of the individual and the priority of the right over the good), would not




a more radically egalitarian position than Rawls's, and also one that was
in a sense more anti-individualistic.""9
Freeman and Nagel are on solid ground. Behind the veil of igno-
rance, Rawlsian legislators know that race (or gender) preferences in the
law could place their and their family's FEO at grave risk, perhaps per-
manently. Beyond this, even assuming they enact the language of the
1964 Civil Pights Act into law, they know that power corrupts, even in
a reasonably just society. Since even such a society needs a criminal jus-
tice system,7 " it follows that "antidiscrimination laws would presumably
be violated occasionally and would therefore need to be enforced."7'
Beyond FEO, Rawls is clear that a person's race alone does not deter-
mine whether he is among the "least advantaged" for purposes of the
difference principle.72 Even if the FEO principle were not lexically prior
to the difference principle, the latter would still yield no basis for strong
forms of affirmative action.
While Freeman and Nagel thus provide support for the premise
that lawlsian legislators would reject racial preferences and quotas, "af-
firmative action" is a broad term. It is a complex policy, legal, and
constitutional phenomenon. It consists of a range of means, ends, con-
texts, and favored groups, 7 and it is not clear R1awls would reject them
all.
Robert Allen, for example, argues that Rawls would allow weak
forms of affirmative action like aggressive recruiting,74 but would reject
75
strong forms of affirmative action like quotas. More recently, Taylor has
69. Thomas Nagel, Raus and Liberalism, in TnE CAMBRIDGE COMPANION TO RAWLS
(Freeman, ed., 2003).
70. "It is clear from the preceding remarks that we need an account of penal sanc-
tions however limited even for ideal theory." THEORY, supra note 17, at 212.
71. See Robert Taylor, Rawlsian Affirmative Action, 119 Emics 476, 480 (2009).
72. As Rawls writes."[in a well ordered society where all citizens' equal basic rights
and liberties and fair opportunities are secure, the least advantaged are those belonging to the
income class with the lowest expectations.... Note here that in the simplest form of the differ-
ence principle the individuals who belong to the least advantaged group are not
identifiable apart from, or independently of, their income and wealth.The least advantaged
are never identifiable as men or women, say, or as whites or as Blacks, or Indians or Brit-
ish." FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 59, n.26 (emphasis added). See also FAIRNESS, supra note 18,
at 65.
Rawls later supplemented this definition of the least advantaged with the three so-
cial contingencies. See FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 55; see also Roy C. Weatherford,
Discussions Defining the Least Advantag~ed, in EQUALITY AND LIBERTY: ANALYZING RAWLS AND
NozICK 37-45 J. Angelo Corlett ed., St. Martin's Press 1991). While Rawls thus refined
this aspect of his theory, he never qualified his claim that least advantaged status is no func-
tion of a person's race in a reasonably just society.
73. See Schuck, supra note 58.
74. Robert Allen, Raillsian Affirnative Action: Compensatory Justice as Seen from the
Original Position, available at www.bu.edu/wcp/Papers/Soci/SociAlle.htm, at 2.
75. Id. at 6-7.
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echoed such a moderate reading. Using Nagel's five point taxonomy of
forms of affirmative action, 7 Taylor argues first that categories one and
two, the weakest forms, can be derived from R1awls's theory.7 " This point
is well taken, for categories one and two amount to strict enforcement
of the nondiscrimination rule that Rawlsian legislators would enact into
their civil rights laws. Taylor argues further that categories four and five,
the strongest forms of affirmative action, can almost never be derived
from Rawls.7 Again, he is on solid ground, for Rawlsian legislators, still
behind the veil of ignorance, would not rationally subject themselves to
a lifetime of the risks posed by the preferences and quotas of these cate-
gories. As for category three interventions-"compensating support"-
Taylor argues that these can be justified, at least under nonideal theory."
Even assuming he applies the distinction between ideal and nonideal
theory in a convincing way,"' however, category three interventions as
Taylor describes them have no direct link to race (or gender). 2 They do
76. Taylor, supra note 71.
77. See id. at 478-79.
78. See id. at 480-81.
79. See id. at 502.
80. See id.
81. The progress in U.S. race relations since the 1950's aside, Taylor simply assumes
that the U.S. in 2010 is not even a reasonably just society regarding race (such that Rawlsian
affirmative action must be assessed under nonideal theory).Yet there are at least two problems
here. First,Taylor uses neither of the two methods Rawls provided for determining the realm
of nonideal theory, i.e., the category approach (see THEORY, supra note 17, at 8) or the
rule/exception approach (see FAIRNESS, s11pra note 18, at 13), and thus leaves a key premise
unsupported. Second, even assuming aiuendo that affirmative action under lkawls must be
analyzed under nonideal theoryTaylor provides no concrete guidance to Rawlsian legislators
on how to vary or distort their application of the two principles ofjustice as a result of being
restricted to nonideal theory. Until such problems are addressed, we can legitimately apply
R.awls's two principles of justice, designed as they are for the reasonably just society, to mat-
ters of race policy. For a full reply to Taylor and others on this issue, see M. Carcieri, Rawls,
Race, and Ideal Tlieory (2009) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
82. When he first references category three interventions, Taylor writes that they are
"designed to compensate for color or gender based disadvantages." Taylor, supra note 68, at
478. In his conclusion, sinilarly, he refers to these interventions as "supplementary gender
and race-based training, mentoring and funding." Id. at 506. When he goes into some detail
on category three interventions in the body of his article, however, Taylor shows no clear
connection between theti and one's race or gender. As he describes category three interven-
tions:
I. Training: to counterbalance the effects of poor schools through SAT
preparation classes, co-op programs, etc.
2. Mentoring: to counteract the results of unsupportive or ill-informed
parents, neighbors, and peers through Big Brother/Big Sister-style pro-
grams, vocational counseling, etc.
3. Funding: to compensate for financial disabilities through scholarships
and fellowships, grants for professional wardrobes, etc.
Id. at 492.
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not conflict with the rule of nondiscrimination, and so are unobjection-
able.
3
Where Taylor uses his category three to analyze the boundary of
permissible forms of affirmative action under Rawls, Allen does so with
his discussion of the tiebreaker, the weakest form of preference. As he
writes, a tiebreaker preference "dictates that a member of a disadvantaged
group be given a sought after position in the event that she is as qualified for
it as other aspirants. ' ' 14 Concluding that Rawls would allow the tiebreaker,
Allen writes, "the scoring of candidates must be based on publicly known,
objective criteria and subject to review. Ties should neither be manufac-
tured nor ignored. The potential for abuse must be acknowledged. But it
warrants safeguards and vigilance, not abandoning the policy."""
This argument seems persuasive. If admissions or hiring decisions at
public universities, for example, were "subject to review" by an independ-
ent body (to ensure that ties are "neither manufactured nor ignored"), our
legislators might reasonably conclude that a non-minority passed over
due to a racial tiebreaker nonetheless had received FEO.Yet our legislators
know that tenured faculty and administrators are certain to lose the
Rawlsian perspective ensured by the veil of ignorance."" History tells
them that those secure in their position or income stream will use prefer-
ences against others to which they would never consent if they were
seeking, rather than secure in, that position or income stream. They know
that without the veil of ignorance to insure that policymakers maintain
the priority of the right over the good, those with security of employ-
ment will pull up the ladder behind them, suddenly privileging theories
of the good like utility or diversity over the principle of individual rights
to which they justifiably clung when they were on the market. Our legis-
lators thus recognize that even the tiebreaker uses some passed-over
applicants as means rather than ends based solely on race, thus violating a
fundamental Kantian norm embraced by Rawls."7
On a fair reading, category three is based on social and economic class, which are
no mere functions of race or gender. See FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 59, n.26. At the same
time, poor schools and unsupportive or ill informed adults and peers are often characteris-
tic of the least advantaged communities, and so reparations as defined in this Article,
channeled in a reasonably efficient manner, could ameliorate many of these effects.
83. Furthermore, these interventions are supported by taxation. They thus diffuse
the burden of race policy over the entire taxpaying public rather than concentrating them
on a few shoulders. See discussion ifra note 139.
84. Robert Allen, supra note 74, at 2 (emphasis added).
85. Id. at 6 (emphasis added).
86. It may be asked how Rawlsian judges and administrators can be trusted to act
justly since the veil has been completely lifted for them as well. An answer would be that
these agents have many other checks on their work, including adversarial litigants with
rights to each other's evidence, the publicity of disputes that go to trial, and a losing party's
right to appeal an administrator's or trial judge's judgment to a higher tribunal.
87. As Allen notes, moreover, affirmative action cannot be justified under Rawls on
the basis that a diverse student body is a good outcome. See id. at 6. Not only is race no
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Admittedly, Allen recognizes, the tiebreaker is a close call under
Pawls.Yet even if Allen is right on this point, it seems likely that Rawlsian
legislators would couple the tiebreaker with a requirement of judicial
oversight over the officials who administer the admissions or hiring proc-
ess at prominent, public institutions."" Since antidiscrimination laws must
be enforced even in a reasonably just society, those like Allen, who
support a good faith application of the tiebreaker, will have no objection
to such oversight.
Based on the foregoing, although some critiques still suggest other-
wise,"f Rfawlsian legislators would reject strong forms of affirmative action
synonym for diversity, Bakke, 438 U.S. at 314, but the riht in Rawls's theory (i.e.,justice to
the individual) is prior to the good.
It is noteworthy that under the FEO principle, Rawlsian legislators would also for-
bid legacy preferences in university admissions, i.e., those for children of alumni. While
they would not try to end inequality, our legislators would not consent to the compound-
ing of such inequality, and thus the reinforcement of a virtual hereditary aristocracy, as
legacy preferences enable.
Preferences for the children of wealthy donors, however, might be a different story.
While private universities would remain subject to Title VI1, such a donor might condition
a sufficiently large financial pledge to such an institution on his child's admission that the
university could rationally judge it to be in its economic interest to forego public financial
assistance, and thus remove itself from the restrictions ofTitle VI.
88. See generally Martin D. Carcieri, The Waes of Taking~ Bakke Seriously: Federal Judi-
cial Oversight of the Public University Admissions Process, 2001 B.Y.U. ED. & L.J. 161 (2001).
Even assuming they would allow the tiebreaker under these circumstances, however, our
legislators would reject the use of "race as one of many factors" in university admissions.
They know from the facts of cases like Grntter that with pressures for universities to
achieve proportional representation of specific races, race becomes the dominant factor in
the adnissions process over time. Rawlsian legislators are thus clear that such preferences
in this form deny FEO to the Barbara Grutters of the world, among whose ranks they
may well find themselves. A fortiori, they would not remotely endorse critical mass, as
Charles claims, supra note 26. That is, if judges can interpret the racial nondiscrimination
rule of Title VI to permit race to equal a full grade point in selective admissions, as in
Grutter, the written rule of law is a sham. Under Rawls, however, this is not an option. See
THEORY, supra note 17, at 206-13.
89. See, e.g., THoMAs POGGE, JOHN RAWLS: His LIFE AND THEORY OF JUSTICE 121
(Oxford Univ. Press, 2007) [hereinafter, POGGE I]; Julie Chi-hye Suk, Antidiscrimination
Lau, in the Administrative State, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 405; David Resnik, Affirmative Action in
Science and Eng~ineering, 14 SCIENCE & ED. 75, 83-84 (2005);Toniiko Brown-Nagin, Elites,
Social Movements, and the Lau,: The Case of Affirmative Action, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1436,
1455-56, n.84 (2005); Fullinwider, supra note 56; Guy-Uriel E. Charles, supra note 26;
Kim Forde-Mazrui, Taking Conservatives Seriously: A Moral Justification for Affirmative Action
and Reparations, 92 CAL. L. REV. 683 (2004); Anita Allen, Race and Ethnicity: Race, Face, and
Rawls, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1677, 1694 (2004); Garth Massey, Thinking About Affirmative
Action: Aiguments Supporting Preferential Policies, 6 REV. POL'Y RES. 783, 792-93 (2004);
Laurence Thomas, Equality and the Mantra of Diversity, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 931, 957-58
(2004); Aaron-Andrew P. Bruhl, Public Reason as a Public Good, 4 J.L. Soc'v 217, 226 n. 26
(2003); Kenneth Deville & Loretta Kopelman, Diversity, Thst, and Patient Care: Affirmative
Action in Medical Education 25 Years after Bakke, 28 J. MED. & PHIL. 489, 492-94 (2003);
Thomas Nagel,John Raw'ls and Affirnative Action, 39 J. BLACKS IN HIGHER ED. 82, 82-83
(2003); Paul Schumaker & Marisa Kelly, Affirmative Action, Principles ofJustice, and the Evolu-
tion of Urban Theory, 34 URI. ArF. REV. 619, 623 (1999); Cass Sunstein, Affirmative Action,
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like preferences or quotas in any form. Milder forms, like outreach and
aggressive recruiting, when conducted in an evenhanded way, are not se-
riously disputed under Rawls. Yet legislators would make racial
nondiscrimination the essential policy of their law, and would oversee its
strict enforcement."'
Caste and Cultural Comnparisons, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1311 (1999); Purvi Badiani, Affirnative
Action in Education: Should Race or Socioecononic Status be Deterininative? 5 GEO.J. FIGHTING
POVERTY 89, 94-96 (1997).
90. Before moving on, the constitutional and statutory dimensions of the issue
should be briefly analyzed.
At the constitutional level, the Supreme Court seems to be dismantling affirmative
action with cases like Parents hivolved and Meredith. If this Article's argument is sound so far,
then it is the Court's conservative majority, not its liberal minority, that is in sync with
Rawls on affirmative action. Rawlsian legislators, after all, would be wary of practices like
the racial tiebreaker in these cases. As in Bakke and Grutter, they are focused on the realm
of public education, and thus the core of civil society, not its periphery. Rationales for race
preferences in the law enforcement, corrections, and military domains are thus of limited
applicability. As our legislators know from cases like Bakke and Grmtter, the allowance of a
tiebreaker can easily lead to the use of "race as a factor," and in turn "critical mass." More-
over, they would be unimpressed by government claims that school districts "voluntarily"
implemented these practices, for this will make no difference to them at all if they turn
out to be among those individuals burdened by them.
While the conservatives prevailed in Parents Involved and Grutter, Justice Kennedy
wrote a thoughtful concurrence clearly distancing himself from the plurality opinion. As
he suggests, Parents Involved and Meredith present a stronger case in Rawlsian terms for the
use of race than did Grutter.
For one thing, the plaintiffs in Parents Involved and Meredith were children in ele-
mentary and high school, not adults in law school. As a prominent conservative judge thus
wrote in support of the Seattle plan, "[it is difficult to deny the importance of teaching
children during their formative years, how to deal respectfully and collegially with peers of
different races." Parents Involved in Cuity. Scli. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 426 F3d 1162, 1194
(9th Cir. 2005) (Kozinski,J., concurring). Secondly, kindergartner Joshua McDonald could
apply year after year for a transfer to the school of his choice, and such applications are
often successful eventually. See Parents Involved, 426 F3d at 29-30. As an adult in her thir-
ties, anxious to start law school so that she can begin her career, Barbara Grutter is losing
time in a way that Joshua is not. Further, if it is hard to transfer from a second tier law
school to a top law school like UM after the first year, it is impossible to do so after the
second year.The distinction between the facts of Parents involved and Meredith on the one
hand and Grutter on the other thus finds support in Rawls's observation that different
stages of life have distinct legitimate claims. See FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 174. Finally, as
the lawyer for Seattle noted at oral argument, the use of race under these plans is "very much
like the little boy in the Dutch story who put his finger in the dike because a few drops of
water were coming out. He knew that it would become a flood eventually if he didn't do
that. We think that is exactly the case here, that without these guidelines one student at a
time could transgress them and ultimately we would have a re-segregated school system." See
http://www.supremecourtus.gov/oral-argunients/argument_transcripts/05-915.pdf at 46-
47 (Supreme Court transcript of Meredith). Since he notes that racially segregated school-
ing and housing patterns affect each other, id. at 49, his claim that compelling state
interests are at stake in these cases is well taken. The essential point, however, is that the
Court as now constituted will very likely overturn Grutter, at least on means, when it can.
As for the statutory dimension, the issue, especially post-Ricci, is whether, beyond an
express ban on intentional discrimination, or "disparate treatment," as in Title VII, Rawl-
sian legislators would also enact a ban on statistical discrimination, or "disparate impact"
(like that announced in Grzqgs v. Duke Power, 401 U.S. 424 (1971), and codified into
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As noted, however, this is only part of this Article's thesis and only a
component of the race-related policy that it appears the President would
support in light of Rawls.Justice as Fairness is subtle and complex, and, as
Anita Allen says, there is "nothing in ,awls to rule out race-conscious
programs that stand to benefit the least advantaged in society.", Affirma-
tive action aside, the question renains whether R-awls's theory yields
progressive race policy, or stated differently, substantial racial justice. The
theory appears to, but to see this, two key distinctions nmust be made, in-
cluding that between affirinative action and reparations. This, in turn,
requires a working definition of reparations, which is discussed in the fol-
lowing section.
Ill. REPARATIONS
As Dean Levmore has observed, "[r]eparations ... is an ill defined
term ... ' "9 Nonetheless, Americans have strong views on "reparations": a
CNN/USA Today/Gallup Poll found that nine out of ten White Ameri-
cans say that government should not pay reparations for slavery and
segregation, while half of African-American respondents respond that it
should.' 3 Judge Charles Norgle's opinion in In re African-American Slaves
Descendants Litigatioi" crystallizes much of the current debate, in both the
political and legal spheres. A brief overview of this opinion, with refer-
legislation by the 1991 Civil Rights Act, 105 Stat. 1071).This is an interesting discussion,
more complex than can be fully addressed here. I thus simply assert that Rawlsian legisla-
tors would not enact a rule of disparate impact for at least three reasons.
First, as Taylor explains, disparate impact's essential focus on equality of result is in-
consistent with Rawls's emphasis on pure procedural justice. See Taylor, supra note 71, at
493, and TkEORY, supra note 17, at 73-78. Second, two such inconsistent directives as dis-
parate treatment and disparate impact are confusing to employers, lawyers and judges, thus
undermining the rule of law and requiring intricate yet inevitably not fully satisfactory
interpretive guidance from the Supreme Court. See Ricci, 129 S. Ct. at 2658, 2674. Third, a
rule of disparate impact is inconsistent with the equal protection clause within which our
legislators are working, as it involves government requiring third parties (employers) to
engage in racial discrinination. See id. (Scalia,J., concurring).
Some have claimed that determined administrators will simply find a way to use
race whether or not it is legal or constitutional. See Joe Klein, There's More Than One Way
to Diversity, TIME, Dec. 18, 2006, at 29; see also Jeffrey Rosen, Can a Law Change a Society?,
N.Y. TiMEs, July 1, 2007, available at www.nytimes.co/2007/07/01/weekinreview/
01 rosen. Upholding the use of race on such a basis, however, simply defers to and rewards
lawlessness, a practice inconsistent with Rawls and constitutional government.
91. Allen, supra note 89, at 1695.
92. Saul Levmore, The Jurispnidence of Slavery Reparations: Privatiziqg Reparations, 84
B.U. L. IRv. 1291, 1294 (2004).
93. Darryl Fears, Seeking More Than Apolqies for Slavery: Activists Hope Firns' Disclo-
sure of Ties Will Lead to Reparations, WAs-. PosT, June 20, 2005, at Al. See also James J.
Hackney, Jr., Ideolqoical Conflict, African-American Reparations, Tort Causation and the Case for
Social Welfare Transformation, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1193, 1203, n.43 (2004).
94. 375 F.Supp. 2d 721 (N.D. III. 2005).
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ences to Chief Judge Posner's opinion affirming "the greater part of"''
Norgle's judgment on behalf of the Seventh Circuit, is thus in order. It
will both flesh out the conceptual terrain of reparations and enable the
development of a working definition of reparations for purposes of Kawl-
sian analysis."
A. In Re: African-Anerican Slave Descendants Litigation (2005)
In reAfrican-American Slaves is not the first attempt to use private law
remedies to redress American slavery and segregation." After several such
lawsuits were consolidated in Judge Norgle's court, " In re African-American
Slaves became the first class action attempt to do use private law reme-
dies." The defendants were private entities FleetBoston, New York Life
Insurance Company, Norfolk Southern Railway Company, Canadian
Railway Company, Lloyds of London and Aetna. Plaintiffs were African-
Americans who sought "to hold [these] corporate defendants liable for
the commercial activities of their alleged precedessors before, during and
after the Civil War in America."'" Judge Norgle granted defendants' Mo-
tion to Dismiss, rejecting the suit on threshold procedural grounds
without reaching the substantive merits of the claims.""
In a well-crafted opinion, Norgle presented an overview of slavery
in America and summarized the arguments for and against reparations.
95. In re African Am. Slave Descendants Litig., 471 E3d 754, 762 (7th Cir. 2006)
[hereinafter i re African Am. Slaves II].
96. For historical and analytical overviews of reparations beyond that in In reAfrican
Ai. Slaves, 375 F Supp. 2d at 726-31, see generally TORPEY, supra note 22, at 8-41; HENRY,
supra note 22, at 9-32; REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY, supra note 22, at 59-96; BROOKS, supra
note 22, at 4-19; DERRICK BELL, RACE, RACISM AND AMERICAN LAW 51-56 (5th ed. 2004)
[hereinafter BELL 11]; Symposium, The Jnrisprudence of Slavery Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV.
1135 (2004); WINBUSH, supra note 22, at Part I: History and Reparations; Posner & Ver-
meule, Reparations for Slavery and Other Historical Injustices, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 689, 694-
99; Charles J. Ogletree, LitgatingZ the Leqacy of Slavery, N.Y. TIMES, March 31, 2002, at 9;
RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WiHAT AMERICA OWES To BLACKS (2000).
97. See, e.g., Cato v. United States, 70 F3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1995);Abdullah v. United
States, No. 3:02cv]030(0BA). 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5129 (D. Conn. Mar. 25, 2003); Bell v.
United States, No. 3:01-CV-0338-D, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14812 (N.I. Tex. July 10.
2001).
98. See Complaint, Porter v. Lloyds of London, No. 02-CV-6180, 2002 WL
32602457 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 29, 2002); Complaint, Farmer-Paellman v. FleetBoston Fin.
Corp., No. 2002cv01862 (E.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002);Johnson v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., No. 02-
CV-9180 (E.D. La. Sept. 3, 2002).
99. For critiques of the filing of these suits, see Robert E Worth, Companies are Sued
for Slave Reparations, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2002, at B2; Editorial, The Great Reparations
Hoax, WASH.TiMES, Mar. 29,2002, at A16.
100. Ii re African An. Slaves, 375 F Supp. 2d at 726.
101. Id. at 726,780-81.
102. See id. at 726-34, Glenn C. Loury, It's Futile to Put a Price on Slavery, N.Y. TIMES,
May 29, 2000, at A15;Tom Bray, Repetitive Reparations Motion, WASH.TMES, Sept. 26, 2000,
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After outlining previous attempts at reparations and describing Mr.
Conyers's efforts," " he discussed a range of procedural and substantive
problems, both statutory and constitutional, with seeking reparations from
courts."" The procedural obstacles include identification of parties and the
doctrines of standing, statute of limitations, and political question.
at Al9;Jeffrey Hart, 'Reparations' in the Political Spectrun, WAsi.TIMES, Sept. 16, 2001, at B4.
See generally the following pieces in REI'ARATIIONS FOR SLAVERY, supra note 22, and WIN-
isuso, supra note 22; David Horowitz, Ten Reasons WIy Reparations for Blacks is a Bad Idea
for Blacks-and Racist Too, in REI'ARArIONS FOR SLAVERY at 127-29; Ernest Allen & Robert
Chrisman, Teti Reasons: A Response to David Horowitz, in REPAR'rIONs FOR SLAVERY, at
130-39; Robert K. Fullinwider, The Case for Reparations, it) REPA RATONS FOR SLAVERY, at
141-51; Stephen Kershnar, 77e Case Ag aist Reparations, in RE aRKtONs FOR SLAVERY, at
151-161; Harper's Magazine, Form: Making the Case for Racial Reparations, in REPARATIONS
FOR SLAVERY, at 263-287; Martha Minow, Between Vetgeance and Foriveness, in REPARATIONS
FOR SLAVERY, at 303-337; John Conyers & Jo Ann Nichols Watson, Reparations: An Idea
Wose Tite Has Coijie, in WINBUSn, at 14-21; Armstrong Williams, Presumed Victims, in
WINBUSiI, at 165-71; Christopher Hitchens, Debt of Honor in WINBUSrt, at 172-79; John
McWhorter, Against Reparations in WINIUSH, at 180-96; Shelby Steele, ... Or a Childish
Illusion ojfJustice?: Reparations Enshrine Victinihood, Dishonoring Our Ancestors in WINBUsin, at
197-99; Jewel Crawford, Wade W. Nobles, & Joy DeGruy Leary, Reparations and Health
Care for African-Americans: Repairing the Damage from tile L gacy of Slavery in WINBUSH, at
251-81; Molly Secours, Riding the Reparations Bandwagon in WINBUSH,, at 286-98.
103. These date to the end of the Civil War, beginning with the proposal to provide
all newly freed slaves "forty acres and a nle." Since World War II, the reparations move-
ment has grown. The U.S. government, for example, has paid reparations to Native
American groups based on treaty obligations and more prominently. in 1988. to Japanese
Americans it forced into internment camps during World War I1. At the state level, repara-
tions have been paid to the African-American victims of the 1923 massacre in Rosewood,
Florida and the 1921 race riots in Tulsa, Oklahoma. In the international realm, Austria,
Germany, ard Swiss banks have compensated Jewish victims for their roles in the Holo-
caust, and Japan reached a settlement with Korean "comfort women" it forced into sexual
slavery for Japanese soldiers during World War 1I. See qencrally CHARLES P HENRY, Siprai
note 22, at Chapter 3; BROOKS.supra note 22. at Xiii: BFi. 11. supra note 96. at 51-56; Kick
Montgomery The Civil Ri lts Battle qf the 21" Century: Drive for Slavery Reparations Gaining
oam' ntn Across the United States, TilE BUFIAI O NEws, at I H; OGiI.FTREiE snplia note 96, at
9: \VINBUSI. suptra note 22, at 14-21: Timar Lewin, Calls For Slavnery Restitntion Getting
Louder, N.Y.'Fimis. June 4, 2001, at A 15; Greg Wright, Decision iNcar on Rctpattionsfor Tdsa
Race Riot, THE ri-mEs UNION.Jan. 30, 2000, at Al 2; Diane Cardwell, Seeking Out ajust Way
To Make Amends for Slavery; The Idea of Reparations for Blacks Is Gaining in Urgency, But a
Knot of Questions Remain, Like: Wiich Blacks?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 12, 2000, at B7; Leslie
Casinir, Koreans Raise Painful Issue: Woman Wants Justice for Japan s WWlI Sex Slaves, N.Y
DAILY NEWs, Nov. 2, 2000, at 2; Lena Williams, Blacks Press the Casefir Reparauicns for Slav-
ery, N.Y. Tims-. July 21, 1994, at B10 Tracie Reddick, Conyers Asks Study Q" Slave
Reparations, N.Y.TiMES, Dec. 8, 1989, at Al.
104. See In re African Am. Slaves, 375 F Supp. 2d at 734-35, 766.
105. "Courts of law ... are constrained by judicial doctrine and precedent ...." In re
African Am. Slaves, 375 F Supp. 2d at 736. See also Eric K. Yamamoto, Racial Reparations:
Japanese American Redress and African-Anterican Claims, 40 B.C. L. Rrv. 477, 491 (1998)
(listing five general obstacles to African-American reparations claims: statute of limitations,
absence of directly harmed individuals, absence of individual perpetrators, lack of direct
causation, and the indeterminacy of compensation amounts). Bit see Charles Ogletree,
Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in America, 38 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 279, 298-308 (2003).
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Regarding the identification of parties, courts are equipped to deal
with claims by well-identified wrongdoers 116 and against well-identified
victims.' 7 With regard to the latter, Norgle ruled against the plaintiffs
partly due to their lack of standing. As he wrote,
when standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the per-
son whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an
adjudication of a particular issue ....
Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the first and most basic requirement of constitutional
standing-a concrete and particularized personal injury.... To the extent
that Plaintiffs are attempting to assert the legal rights of their ancestors,
Plaintiffs cannot do so because they themselves have failed to establish that
they have personally suffered some injury-in-fact adequate to satisfy Article
Ill's case-or-controversy requirement.
Beyond the need for well-identified parties, a judicial forum requires
proof that defendants' actions were the actual and proximate cause of
plaintiffs' injuries.'' As time passes, such proof becomes increasingly diffi-
cult, leading to the statute of limitations problem. As Professor Epstein
explains, "a statute of limitations has two major purposes. The first pur-
pose is to make sure that the cause of action is brought when the
evidence is fresh so that a trial can conclude with tolerable accuracy.,
Since the actions complained of in In re African-American Slaves occurred
generations ago, Norgle's statute of limitations ruling was no surprise."'
106. See In re African Ami. Slaves, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 735. If government is among the
defendants, the doctrine of sovereign immunity may bar the suit. This problem vanishes if
defendants are private firms, as in In re African Ai. Slaves, but the fact remains that slavery
was legal when these firms entered the contracts at issue. In any case, only state and na-
tional government, and not municipalities, are protected under the sovereign immunity
doctrine. See Ogletree, supra note 105, at 306.
107. See Hanoch Dagan, The Jurisprudence of Slavery Reparations: Restitution and Slavery:
On Incomplete Cotntnodification, Intergenerational Justice, and Legal Transitions, 84 B.U. L. REV.
1139, 1141 (2004). Unlike payments to victims of the Holocaust and the Japanese Ameri-
can internment camps, reparations for African-American slavery and, in most cases, legally
enforced segregation, would not be awarded to surviving victims.
108. In re African Ani. Slaves, 375 F Supp. 2d at 753-54 (quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392
U.S. 83, 99 (1968)). Once again, the Seventh Circuit affirmed Norgle centrally on the basis
of standing. See SDL II, 471 F3d 754, 762.
109. See In re African Ani. Slaves I, 471 E3d at 759; Forde-Mazrui, supra note 89, at
727-37; Hackney, supra note 93, at 1195-97.
110. Richard Epstein, 77te Jurispnidence of Slavery Reparations: The Case Against Black
Reparations, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1177, 1183 (2004). See also Keith Hylton, Slavery and Tort Laiv,
84 B.U. L. REV. 1209, 1212 (2004). On this issue, Ogletree notes instances in which the
statute of limitations may be tolled, waived, or inapplicable. See Ogletree, supra note 105, at
299-305.
111. See fit re African Ani. Slaves II, 471 E3d at 759. But see BROOKS, supra note 22, at
Chapter 3.
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Finally, Norgle based his decision on political question grounds.
Under this doctrine, also rooted in Article III's case or controversy principle,
a federal court is powerless to hear a dispute where 1) the text of the Con-
stitution clearly commits the issue to another branch of government,
2) judicially manageable standards by which a court could resolve the dis-
pute are lacking, or 3) there is present any of several other factors making
judicial determination of the matter politically imprudent." In view of
such problems, Judge Norgle argued that legislatures, especially Congress,
are best suited for providing reparations like those sought in SDL. "3 They
have flexibility that courts lack, after all, both in the remedies they can pro-
vide and in their need to respond only to political limitations, not legal
doctrine and precedent."4 While state legislatures can provide reparations, as
in the Rosewood and Tulsa cases,"" only Congress can act for the nation.
Given Judge Norgle's argument and Mr. Conyers's efforts, when reparations
112. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). See also In re African Ai. Slaves II, 471
F3d at 758-59.Judge Posner finessed the political question issue, ruling that it would not
necessarily bar this lawsuit if several conditions were met.
Beyond these procedural hurdles to judicial reparations is an array of remedial and
substantive problems. An example of the former is that a party seeking money damages
must show that those damages are measurable with reasonable precision. Among the rules
courts take seriously, in other words, is that the word "remedy" has a precise rather than
vague meaning, at least in a judicial forum, as Justice Powell has made clear. See Regents of
Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 291 (1978).Where plaintiffs' alleged damages cannot
be proven with reasonable precision, a court is powerless to award them.
As for substance, claims for reparations in tort are for wrongful injury and conver-
sion while those in contract are for unjust enrichment and restitution. On restitution, see
In re African Ai. Slaves 1!, 471 F.3d at 760. See generally Brooks, supra note 22, at Chapter 4;
Lyons, supra note 1, at 1382-84; Omari L. Winbush, Reflections on Hoimer Plessy and Reparations
in WINBUSH, supra note 22, at 150, 152-53; Dennis Klimchuk, Unjust Enrichment and Repara-
tions for Slavery, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1257 (2004); Anthony Sebok, Two Concepts of Injustice in
Restitution for Slavery, 84 B.U. L. REv. 1405 (2004); Emily Sherwin, Reparations and Unjust
Enricli,,ent, 84 B.U. L.REV. 1443 (2004); Andrew Kull, Restitution in Favor of Former Slaves,
84 B.U. L.REV. 1277 (2004).
Substantive constitutional bases for reparations that have been suggested or at-
tempted include the Equal Protection, Due Process, and Takings clauses. For equal
protection, see Obadele v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 432 (2002), which unsuccessfully
claimed a denial of equal protection when Japanese Americans were awarded reparations
by the U.S. government but African-Americans were not. As for due process, Richard E
Scruggs has suggested "a Fourteenth and Fifth Amendment lawsuit against the federal
government for either failure to enact sufficient laws to ensure due process or for passing
laws that perpetuated the injustice[.]" Harper's Forum, in REPARATIONS FOR SLAVERY, supra
note 22, at 278. For takings, see, e.g., Kaiipono David Wengcr. Slaiery as a Tkings Clase
Violation, 53 Am. U.L. R-v. 191 (2003);Yanessa L. Barnard, Better Lite 7"ha, Never:A 7Zikinis
Clause Solution to Reparations. 12 WAsi. & LEE R.E.A.L.J. I19 (2005).
113. See In re African Ain. Slaves, 375 F. Supp. 2d at 735-36.
114. Notwithstanding this basic institutional distinction, some writers fail to distin-
guish judicial from legislative reparations, thus weakening the force of their arguments. See,
e.g., HOWARD McGARY, RACE AND SOCIAL JUSTICE 57-58 (Blackwell Pub. 1999).
115. See discussion, supra note 103.
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are discussed in the remainder of this Article, they shall refer to those that
Congress can provide.
With Congress as the source of reparations, a host of problems disap-
pear. Not the least of these is that the party that is to pay reparations-the
U.S. government-has now been established. Even limiting ourselves to
Congress, however, problems remain; some of these are parallel to those in
the judicial forum, and some are not.
The first problem is political obstacles. Congress is limited only by
political considerations, yet that which liberates, imprisons. Unlike federal
judges, members of Congress must stand for reelection, and polls show
great public disfavor for reparations.1'' These polls are said to reflect the
judgment that reparations would be divisive by creating resentment and
thus exacerbating rather than healing race relations.'7
Second, and related, are economic considerations. Assuming that repa-
rations would be drawn from general U.S. tax revenues, where would the
dollars, presumably in the billions, come from, in an age of economic crisis,
two wars, massive federal deficits, and the looming costs of retiring baby
boomers, to provide such reparations? While the details are beyond the
scope of this Article, with a little political imagination and courage, this is
not necessarily an insurmountable obstacle.""
Third, although we now know who is to pay reparations, it is not
clear who should receive them. The answer to this partly depends on the
form reparations take, so a brief overview of the means at Congress's dis-
posal in providing reparations is useful.
1. Means of Reparations Available to Congress
The means available to Congress for providing reparations range from
the weaker and more symbolic to the stronger and less symbolic.' 9 Perhaps
the most symbolic form of reparations is official apologies,'2" which can be
issued by the government, as in the 1988 Civil Liberties Act,' -' or by private
116. See Fears, supra note 93 and accompanying text.
117. See In re African Am. Slaves, 375 E Supp. 2d at 732-33; Bray, supra note 102, at
A19; GLENN C. LOURY,THE ANATOMY OF RACIAL INEQUALITY 131-32 (Harvard Univ. Press
2002);Jonathan Capehart, Contrition forAnericas Curse, WASH. POST, Apr. 12, 2007, at A27.
118. See infra note 212.
119. See TORPEY, supra note 22, at Chapter 2; BRooKs, supra note 22, at 155-63.
120. See POSNER & VERMEULE, supra note 96, at 729-33; Minow, supra note 102, at
310--14; Onari Winbush in WINBUSH, supra note 22, at 151.
121. Besides the U.S. government, "[sleveral states, such as Virginia, North Carolina
and Maryland, have already approved ... apologies, and others, like Alabama and Florida,
are considering it." Frank Lombardi, Council Weighing Slavery Apology, N.Y. DAILY NEWS,
Apr. 24, 2007, at 20. See also Lynn Bonner, North Carolina Senate OKs Slavery Apology, THE
STAR-LEDGER, Apr. 6, 2007, at 49; Capehart, supra note 117.
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defendants.' 22 Apologies cost nothing, although they can lay the foundation
for other forms of reparations in the future.'1
2 3
Less purely symbolic are gestures like establishing monuments,'24 of-
ficial holidays,'2' and commissions like those Mr. Conyers proposed. 1 ' Less
symbolic still are mandatory disclosure and data collection laws, 27 and
least symbolic (and thus strongest of all) is the provision of financial re-
sources in some form. These include college scholarships, waivers from
federal taxation,'2 " and cash payments. '2 Regarding the last option, Norgle
writes,
Most commonly . . . the term "reparations" simply means some sort of fi-
nancial compensation for descendants of slaves. Some ... have proposed
that reparations take the forni of a "trust . . . established for the benefit of
all Black Americans." This trust "should be financed by funds drawn annu-
ally from the general revenue of the United States," and the funds would
"be expendable on any project or pursuit aimed at the educational and eco-
nomic empowenient" of African-Americans. Specifically, advocates of
reparations assert that trust funds should be used to finance the creation of
special schools for Black children found to be "at risk in unhealthy family
and neighborhood environments.""'
122. Aetna and Wachovia have issued apologies. See Lewin, supra note 65, and Fears,
supra note 93.
123. See Posner & Vernieule, supra note 92, at 730.
124. See Henry, supra note 22, at ch. 6.
125. See Montgomery, siipra note 103, at I1H; Minow, supra note 102, at 315-318.
126. As to the effects of such commissions, Ogletree speaks of a "new reckoning,"
Ogletree, supra note 96, at 9, and of education of the public. See Ogletree, supra note 105,
at 306. As he continues,"the underlying goals of both slavery and non-slavery lawsuits are
the same. Both seek to end a tradition of denying the consequences of slavery and Jim
Crow era segregation, and both seek to force the nation to engage in an informed debate
about race and racism in America." Id. at 319.The word "dialogue" also shows up, suggest-
ing in a broad way the function of the South African truth and reconciliation commission
(although that exact model would likely not be the form we would expect since the
original perpetrators of African-American slavery, and even segregation, are long gone).
See Fears, supra note 93, at 2; see also Minow, supra note 102, at 305-310, 319.
127. See Fears, supra note 93, at A01; Montgomery, supra note 103;Tamar Lewin, Calls
for Slavery Restitution Getting Louder, N.Y. TIMEs, June 4, 2001, at 15; Ogletree, supra note
105, at 319.These are state laws, however, and this Article focuses on Congress.
128. See Williams, supra note 102, at BI0. While these proposals are not without
merit, we shall see that they cannot be derived from kawls's difference principle since
they are not targeted at the "least advantaged."
129. Given the range of means at Congress's disposal for providing reparations,Judge
Norgle observes that "the following definition of slave "reparations" ... emerges. Repara-
tions mean truth commissions that document the history of racial crimes and the current
liability for those crimes, apologies that acknowledge liability, and payments to settle that
account." In reAfrican Am. Slaves, 375 E Supp. 2d at 734.
130. In re African Am. Slaves, 375 E Supp. 2d at 733 (citations omitted).
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C. A Working Definition of Reparations
Three aspects of this passage yield points of departure for a working
definition of reparations for purposes of this Article. First, Norgle notes
that "reparations" are most commonly understood as financial resources.
Therefore, beyond apologies, monuments, commissions, and holidays, my
working definition of reparations will include appropriations by Congress.
At the same time, the financial resources to be identified in this Article in
no way consist of cash payments to individuals.13 ' They will instead be
resources targeted at the community level.'"
3 2
Second, Norgle identifies African-Americans as the presumptive
beneficiaries of reparations. While this piece argues that some African-
American communities are appropriate targets of Rawlsian reparations,
we shall see that, where Rawlsian justice is the goal, African-Americans as
a group are both overinclusive and underinclusive as a policy target.
Third, many have opined on the appropriate content of the "pro-
ject[s] or pursuit[s]" mentioned by Norgle. Robinson argues that
reparations should be paid to private institutions whose mission is to pro-
vide educational and other benefits to impoverished Blacks.' 3 Ogletree
speaks of "broad ranging educational, housing, and health care initia-
tives "''' and Hackney writes that "if reparations are to be granted, they
should be in the form of social welfare programs delivered by the federal
government. ' 3 Lyons provides one of the more complete descriptions of
what might be involved, speaking of "the material component [as] a
131. Reparations as cash payments are not usually sought for individuals, but instead
to finance social and econonic programs for minorities. Scc, e.g., Omari Winbush, in WIN-
BUSH, supra note 22, at 152; Montgomery, supra note 103, at 1H. In her critique of
reparations, Forde-Mazrui assumes that they would take the form of lump sum cash pay-
ments to individuals. See Forde-Mazrui, supra note 89, at 751 .This assumption renders her
critique partly irrelevant for our purposes. While cash payments to individuals are a basic
feature of judicial reparations, legislatures can provide them as well, as in the 1988 Civil
Liberties Act, which paid $1.2 billion to 60,000 survivors of the Japanese American in-
ternment camps.This Article's definition is distinct from both.
132. This may seem an inappropriate use of the term "reparations," but we must
distinguish reparative from compensatory justifications for the legislative appropriation of
public resources. In one sense, "compensation" means "that which is necessary to restore
an injured party to his former position." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 256 (5th ed. 1979). In
this sense, to compensate is to pay back an individual or group one has wronged, a mean-
ing that rests on notions of culpability and fault. In a broader sense, however,
"compensation" simply means "making whole." d. In this sense, it means to repair, where
repairs are needed, regardless of fault.This seenis, for example, to be how Daniels uses the
phrase "compensatory measures." Norman Daniels, Raiwls's Complex Egalitarianismn, in
Freeman, supra note 24, at 250. This Article use "reparations" in this second sense, to refer-
ence the provision of resources in a reparative but not narrowly compensatory way. This
Article thus dissociates itself from Norgle's use of the word "compensation" in the phrase
"financial compensation."
133. See ROBINSON, supra note 96, at 244-46.
134. Ogletree, supra note 105, at 307.
135. Hackney, supra note 93, at 1194.
SPRING 2010]
Michigat Journal of Race & Law
comprehensive program under familiar categories such as health, nutri-
tion, housing, family life, education, and community conditions .... A
common theme of these writers is that reparations should be provided in
trust to community-based organizations. 37 For purposes of lRawlsian
analysis, therefore, this Article's working definition of reparations will be:
Appropriations by Congress from general revenues for comprehensive
community based programs directed at the health, education and welfare of
children in communities that are both 1) among the poorest and
2) predominantly African-American, Native American, and/or any other
group Congress is willing to include. 3
Several points are now in order. First, while perfect accountability is
not to be expected even in a reasonably just society, a Rawlsian Congress
would conduct strict oversight of the use of reparations as defined in this
Article. Second, the phrase "any other groups Congress is willing to in-
clude" is included to allow the legislative flexibility legitimately needed in
defining which communities are "least advantaged" for Rawlsian pur-
poses. Third, it is worth underscoring again how this definition differs
from the popular conception of reparations. As this Article defines them,
reparations are not a judicial remedy, and they are not cash payments to
individuals, nor are they "compensatory" in a sense that assigns guilt or
liability for the conditions of the targeted communities. Instead, they are
directed at geographical communities, though not racial communities per
136. Lyons, supra note 1, at 1400. Focused on the needs of children, Lyons's definition
includes prenatal care, postnatal care, nutritious school breakfasts and lunches, affordable,
well maintained housing, well tended, environmentally safe neighborhoods, small class sizes
in school, and adequate day care and time with their parents (such that parents need jobs
requiring no more than one shift to live in reasonable comfort). See id. at 1400-01 and
DAVID COLE, No EQUAL JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE
SYSTEM 13, 189-92 (The New Press 1999).
As Forde-Mazrui adds, "remedial programs should be designed to provide educa-
tional and economic opportunities, and to strengthen familial and community institutions
that foster self-respect and personal responsibility. [What is needed are] sensibly designed
antipoverty, school improvement, job training, health care, and crime prevention efforts
supported by sufficient resources." Forde-Mazrui, supra note 89, at 748.
137. Programs along these lines, like the Model Cities and Community Action Pro-
grams, were tried in the 1960's. See Kara Lamb, Revitalization fromn the Inside Out: The
Attempts to Move Towards an Urban Renaissance in the Cities of the United States and the United
Kiingdotn, 19 CONN.J. INT'L. L. 159, 167 (2003); William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare
Rights:A History, Critique, and Reconstruction, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 1821, 1842-45 (2001);
Audrey G. MacFarlane, Race, Space, and Place: The Geography of Economic Development, 36
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295, 317-18 (1999).These programs had their problems, but support in
Rawls was not one of them.
138. The reasons for the distinctions and qualifications in this definition will begin to
emerge once we begin to apply his theory to our subject matter. For now, "poorest" will
be understood in terms of average combined wealth and income. Moreover, this Article
does not dispute that Rawlsian legislators would approve Levmore's proposal for the al-
lowance of voluntary private appropriations. See Levnore, supra note 92. This Article's focus
is on the use of public revenue, which is directly implicated under Rawls's theory, espe-
cially his second principle ofjustice.
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se, and they are reparative: the point is to repair, not to perfection, but in
accord with Rawls's principles ofjustice.
Finally, this Article does not underestimate the political and eco-
nomic obstacles to providing reparations as defined. For now, it appears
this definition will appeal to Rawlsian agents because it ensures that the
burdens of race conscious policy are collectively borne and the benefits of
that policy are broadly distributed to the least advantaged communities.
IV. PAWLS AND REPARATIONS
A. Distinguishing Affirmative Action and Reparations
To take stock, it appears that Rawlsian legislators would reject strong
forms of affirmative action, and a working definition of reparations has
been developed. As our legislators begin to contemplate the possibility of
reparations, it appears that they would quickly notice a stark difference
between affirmative action and reparations as defined. While racial prefer-
ences and quotas concentrate the burden of race policy on a few
applicants for university admission or employment, reparations diffuse that
burden over the entire taxpaying public. As Posner and Vermeule observe,
(T)he proximate costs of (affinative action) are borne not by general
taxpayers, as with cash reparations, but by marginal candidates from non-
preferred groups....
In affimiative action schemes, the costs of remediation are typically
concentrated on a small group of identified or identifiable individuals: the
nonblack applicants who would have obtained a job, admissions slot, or
contract in the absence of the governmental affirmative action scheme....
[T]he costs of affirmative action fall upon a largely notional group-
marginal nonpreferred candidates, who may often not know whether the
preference was dispositive in denying them relevant goods or opportunities,
and who are unlikely to be able to organize for effective political
action....
Broadening the class of payers increases the probability that victims
will receive reparations while spreading the cost widely .... Prudential
considerations suggest that the cost should be borne generally, not just by
marginal workers. The prudential argument on the other side-that it is
politically, and possibly administratively, easier to assign the costs to
marginal workers-is morally unattractive. "
139. Posner & Verneule, supra note 96, at 689, 712, 718, 729, 738. See also MARTIN,
supra note 31, at 78. Minow echoes this general idea in the restitution context when she
observes that "taxing a larger group, even the entire society, ... would spread the burden
more fairly" Minow, supra note 102, at 309. Indeed, even Forde-Mazrui concedes the
problem. As she writes, "[w]e indeed should consider who is most acutely burdened by
remedial programs, but that should not preclude such programs if the cost to individuals
can be adequately minimized or spread among many people." Forde-Mazui, supra note 89,
at 725.
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These views are echoed in Amdur's "equal sacrifice" principle:
"When it is not possible to assign the costs of compensation either to the
perpetrators or to the beneficiaries of injustice, those costs should be dis-
tributed evenly among the entire community."'"' He then argues that this
principle can be supported on Kawlsian grounds:
From a RFawlsian perspective, the case for equal sacrifice is ... compel-
ling .... It is, of course, one of his major contentions that the features of
the original position force the hypothetical contractees to choose conserva-
tively .... When the parties in the original position meet to choose
non-ideal principles, each will seek to avoid the risk of having to pay a dis-
proportionate share of the costs of compensation. This should lead to a
unanimous preference for equal sacrifice over any principle that assigns
larger costs to fewer people....
The programs that satisfy the third principle most easily are pro-
grams involving monetary compensation, paid for through taxation." 4 '
Under affirmative action, far fewer individuals bear the burden of
race-based policy than under reparations as defined, as Rawlsian legisla-
tors would realize.14 2 Yet they would notice more than this. Although far
fewer individuals bear the burden of race-based policy under affirmative
action, the magnitude of the burden they must shoulder is far greater un-
der affirmative action than under reparations as defined. While millions of
taxpayers are assessed a few cents or dollars more to support reparations,'
140. Robert Amdur, CopipeisatoryJitstice: 71e Question of Costs, 7 POL. TEo. 229,234
(1979).
141. Id. at 236,240 (emphasis added).
142. Our legislators would thus reject statements like:
we should be aware that efforts to achieve a morally good society for a time
may bring about disharmony and social unrest. A morally decent society, in
my judgment is willing to pay these costs.... If nothing can be done to as-
sure that all who are capable and willing receive (employment) positions,
then this unhappiness should fall on everyone, not just on those who have
historically been disadvantaged.
McGARY, supra note 114, at 91, 107. Rawlsian legislators know, that is, that under affirma-
tive action as generally understood, it is emphatically not "society" that pays the costs, and
it is not "everyone" who bears the "unhappiness" that inevitably flows from living in a
world of scarcity. It is rather a few individuals in the non-preferred races that bear the
entire burden.
143. Rawls offers the following on applying the difference principle through taxa-
tion:
[Slince the difference principle applies to institutions as public systems of
rules, their requirements are foreseeable. They do not involve any more con-
tinuous or regular interference with individuals' plans and actions than do,
say, familiar forms of taxation. Since the effects of those rules are foreseen,
they are taken into account when citizens draw up their plans in the first
place. Citizens understand that when they take part in social cooperation,
their property and wealth, and their share of what they help to produce, are
subject to the taxes, say, which background institutions are known to impose.
Moreover, the difference principle (as well as the first principle and the first
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those burdened by race preferences in selective university admissions, for
example, are denied what rational agents behind the veil of ignorance
would recognize as a major, life enhancing opportunity-admission to the
most prominent educational program possible. "4 When race preferences
are thereafter used in the labor market, the burden is magnified. Having
had to attend lower ranked schools due to their race, for example, those in
Barbara Grutter's position must thereafter compete for jobs, perhaps time
and again, not only against minorities whose race earns them a preference
for those jobs, but whose race was decisive in their admission to programs
that give them an edge in the labor market, even apart from their race.
It is thus not simply that reparations as defined greatly spread out
and diminish the burdens of race policy while strong forms of affirmative
action concentrate and increase them. The difference between the bur-
dens imposed by the two policies is one of kind, not just degree. This not
only cuts sharply against the leveling thrust of the difference principle, but
it also deeply offends the FEO principle. As Rawls writes,
Fair equality of opportunity is said to require not merely that public offices
and social positions be open in the formal sense, but that all should have a
fair chance to attain them. To specify the idea of a fair chance we say: sup-
posing that there is a distribution of native endowments, those who have the
same level of talent and ability and the same willingness to use these gifts should
have the same prospects of success regardless of their social class of origin, the class
part of the second principle) respects legitimate expectations based on the
publicly recognized rules and the entitlements earned by individuals.
FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 51-52. Reparations as defined would thus not upset the legiti-
mare expectations of the least advantaged, or anyone else. See THEORY, supra note 17, at 72-
77.
As Amdur adds, "[u]nder the principle of equal sacrifice, every individual need not
contribute the same ansount. When money payments are at issue, equality of sacrifice is
likely to require progressive taxation." Amdur, supra note 140, at 243 n.8. Even assuming a
progressive tax scheme, the burdens under reparations as defined are far less unequal than
under affirmative action as defined.
144. As Rawls observes:
It hardly seems likely that persons who view themselves as equals, entitled to
press their claims upon one another, would agree to a principle which may
require lesser life prospects for some simply for the sake of a greater sum of
advantages enjoyed by others.... In the absence of strong and lasting be-
nevolent impulses, a rational man would not accept a basic structure merely
because it maxinized the algebraic sum of advantages irrespective of its per-
manent effects on his own basic rights and interests.
THEORY, supra note 17, at 13.As Loury adds,
the plain fact is that access to elite higher education dramatically enhances
one's chances to acquire influence in our putatively meritocratic society.
Conspetition for a relatively few seats at the table of power is keen, and many
chafe at the idea of their child's place being taken by someone "undeserving."
So the process of selecting those who will enter the prestigious colleges and
universities is a visible, high stakes civic exercise.
LOURY, supra note 117, at 131-32 (enmphasis added).
SPRING 2010]
MichiganJournal of Race & Law
into which they are born and develop until the age of reason. In all parts of
society there are to be roughly the same prospects of culture and achieve-
ment for those similarly motivated and endowed."
Given this definition of FEO, as well as affirmative action's com-
pounding of injuries based on race, "1 our legislators would firnily
distinguish affirmative action from reparations as defined. Many writers,
however, overlook and even obscure this distinction. Posner and Vermeule
use reparations to include affirmative action,'47 for example, and Levmore
speaks of affirmative action as a substitute for reparations. 4 8 Shiffrin blends
the two together when she claims that "many of the pressing issues re-
garding race, such as reparations and affirmative action, are intimately
connected with redress for and reconstruction in the face of public fail-
ures and wrongs toward people of color.' 4" In addition, many scholars
implicitly fail to distinguish affirmative action and reparations when they
145. FAiRNr.ss, supra note 18, at 43-44 (emphasis added); see also id. at 46. As Rawls
notes, "the principle of open positions ... expresses the conviction that if some places
were not open on a basis fair to all, those kept out would be right in feeling unjustly
treated even though they benefited from the greater efforts of those who were allowed to
hold them." THEORY, supra note 17, at 73. Along these linesJustice Powell observed that
[A]LL state-imposed classifications that rearrange burdens and benefits on the
basis of race are likely to be viewed with deep resentment by the individuals
burdened. The denial to innocent persons of equal rights and opportunities
may outrage those so deprived and therefore may be perceived as invidious.
These individuals are likely to find little comfort in the notion that the dep-
rivation they are asked to endure is merely the price of membership in the
dominant majority and that its imposition is inspired by the supposedly be-
nign purpose of aiding others. One should not lightly dismiss the inherent
unfairness of, and the perception of mistreatment that accompanies, a system
of allocating benefits and privileges on the basis of skin color and ethnic ori-
gin.
Bakke, 438 U.S. at 294, n.34 (emphasis in original).
146. Rawls thus refers to "injustice if those already disadvantaged are also arbitrarily
treated in particular cases when the rules would give them some security." THEORY, supra
note 17, at 51."The rules" here are those mandating racial nondiscrimination.
147. See e.g., Posner &Vermeule, sipra note 96, at 727-29.
148. See Levmore, supra note 92, at 1688-89.
149. Shiffrin, supra note 67, at 1654. In McGary's words, "[piroviding African-
Americans only with money ... will not suffice. There must be other things involved in
the reparation. For African-Americans, power to make decisions that affect their lives is
paramount. Preferential hiring and educational programs might serve to give African-
Americans this power." McGARv, supra note 114, at 99. See also id. at 100-04, 130-31,
where he also blurs the distinction. As for Forde-Mazrui, she refers more than once to
"reparations and other remedial policies," Forde-Mazrui, supra note 89, at 739, and "af-
firmative action or other remedial measures," id. at 747. After arguing at length, moreover,
for precise remedial policies that sound like reparations as defined in this Article, she lapses
in her conclusion into several references to affirmative action. Whether or not she achieves
her goal of responding to conservatives, she fails to speak to the implications of liberal
theory as embodied in Rawls. See id. at 748-51.
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claim in various ways that "affirmative action" alone can "remedy"
correct,"' 5 or "redress"'' 2 racial inequality.'5
Nonetheless, for the reasons given, Rlawlsian legislators would dis-
tinguish affirmative action from reparations as defined, and reject strong
forms of the former. As they now contemplate the latter, two further
premises become relevant and must be made clear.The first is that ,awls
firmly distinguishes between the principles governing two domains of
public policy. The second is that although he was clear that "least advan-
taged" is no synonym for racial group membership, Rawls nonetheless left
race on the table as a potential category of public policy. After establishing
these two premises, this Article argues that given their unique combina-
tion of knowledge and ignorance, and tasked with enacting the
difference ' and FEO principles into law, our legislators would support
reparations as defined.'"
B. Two Domains of Public Policymakin
Let us begin with the distinction between the principles governing
two domains of public policy. We have seen that "[tihe basic structure is to
secure citizens' freedom and independence, and continually to moderate
tendencies that lead, over time, to greater inequalities in social status and
150. As Badian, writes, "affirmative action is needed to remedy the disadvantages
faced by individuals on the basis of their socioeconomic and racial status." Purvi Badiani,
Affirmative Action in Edcation: Should Race or Socioecononic Status be Detcrininative?, 5 GEO.J.
FIGHTING POVERTY 89, 96 (1997).
151. Feinberg writes that "tflor Rawls it is critical that positions are open and that
assignment to them not be dependent on accidental characteristics such as race, gender,
etc. Whenever patterns of disadvantage develop as a result of such discrimination, it is im-
portant to correct them."Walter Feinberg,Justice and AfftrntativeAction:A Response to Howe,
18 STUDIES IN PIii.osomY AND EDUc. 277,284 (1999).
152. Rosado speaks of affirmative action as necessary under the principle of"redress."
Caleb Rosado, Affirmative Action: A Tinefor Change?, Research Room: EdChange Multi-
cultural Pavilion, Mar. 3, 1997, available at http://edchange.org/multicultural/papers/
caleb/aff-action.html. See also, e.g., Scott Cummings, Affirmative Action and the Rhetoric of
Individual Riukhuts: Reclaitning Liberalism as a "Color-Conscious" Theory, 13 HARv. BLACKLETTER
J. 183 (1997) (arguing that a liberal theory can include "racial redress" without distinguish-
ing reparations and affirmative action).
153. Judge Norgle observes that reparations advocates propose that race-based policy
take the form, inter alia, of"affirmative action programs." In re African Ami. Slaves, 375 F
Supp. 2d at 733. The fact that some reparations supporters advocate "affirmative action"
does not make reparations and affirmative action synonyms.
154. "We are to proceed by selecting a few instruments, as we may call them, that can
be adjusted so as to meet the difference principle ..... FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 161.
155. Although du Plessis works within the problematic international context, I share
his general view that "the liberal theory ofjustice advanced by John Rawls would arguably
also support a claim for reparation." Max du Plessis, Reparations and International Lau,: Hou
are Reparations to be Deteriniied (Past Wrongs or Current Effects), Against Whom, and 4hat Forni
Should they Take? 22 WINDSOR Y.B. AcCESS JusT. 41,52 n.43 (2003).
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wealth, and in the ability to exert political influence and to take advantage
of available opportunities.' 5 " Accordingly, Rawls writes, what is needed
is a division of labor between two kinds of principles, each kind suitably
specified: first, those that regulate the basic structure over time and are de-
signed to preserve background justice frorn one generation to the next; and
second, those that apply directly to the separate and free transactions be-
tween individuals and associations. Defects in either kind of principle can
result in a serious failure of the conception ofjustice as a whole. '"S
Just as the distinction between affirmative action and reparations
opened up previously unseen prospects, this "division of labor" opens up
the possibility of reparations as defined. This is because it enables our leg-
islators to give both the individualist and collectivist principles their
due-in different domains of public policy. To secure individual justice (at
the micro level) in separate and free transactions between individuals and
associations (for example, employment and admissions applications), legis-
lators would enact provisions like Titles II,VI and VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act, thus making racial nondiscrimination against "any person" the
basic policy of their civil rights laws. To advance broad collective goals (at
the macro level) like "moderat[ing] tendencies that lead, over time, to
greater inequalities in social status and wealth," and thus preserving back-
ground justice, they would be prepared to use "race as a factor" in some
areas of public policy, even those allocating public resources.'S" For Rawls,
the difference principle acts as a counterweight to the equal liberty and
FEO principles. In a similar way, public policy aimed at collective goals
like preserving background intergenerational justice functions as a just
counterweight to the individualized focus governing separate and free
transactions under Rawls's theory."59 While our legislators would reject
156. FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 159.
157. Id. at 53-54. See also LIBERALISM, supra note 64, at 268, where Rawls elaborates a
bit further on this distinction. Rawls, it should be noted, includes universities among "as-
sociations." See FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 93.
158. Since they are both collectively borne and distributed, legislative means like
reparations as defined are not only an appropriate tool for advancing collective goals, but
as Amdur suggests, they are consistent with the risk aversion Rawls attributes to all deci-
sion makers, even legislators, behind the veil. See Anidur, supra note 140, at 236.
159. Two things are noteworthy here. First, as Talisse writes, "Rawls stipulates that
the difference principle is to evaluate distributions among what he calls 'representative
persons,' which are perhaps best understood as socio-economic classes rather than as indi-
vidual persons." TALISSE, supra note 16, at 44 (quoting THiEORY, supra note 17, at 56).
Second, we saw that Rawls argues that property owning democracy is the regime most
likely to realize the two principles ofjustice. See FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 136-40.
[Tlhe background institutions of property-owning democracy work to dis-
perse the ownership of wealth and capital .... [They] ensur[e] the widespread
ownership of productive assets and human capital (that is, education and
trained skills) at the beginning of each period .... The intent is ... to put all




racial preferences and quotas, this division of labor creates the possibility
of race conscious policy by Rawlsian legislators.
To see this more clearly, consider the following:
Why are distinctions of race . . . not explicitly included among the three
contingencies (social class of origin, native endowments, and the chance to
develop those endowments) ... ? The answer is that we are mainly con-
cerned with ideal theory: the account of the well-ordered society ofjustice
as fairness. Within that account we need to distinguish ... what contingen-
cies tend to generate troubling inequalities even in a well ordered society
and thus prompt us, along with other considerations, to take the basic structure as
the primary subject ofjustice .... ",'
Since race "tends to generate troubling inequalities," Rawls suggests
it can be taken into account "along with other considerations," but only
where legislators are focused on background justice at the level of the
basic structure. Rawls wrote, "[t]here are questions which we feel sure
must be answered in a certain way. For example, we are confident that
religious intolerance and racial discrimination are unjust.""' Yet it has
been demonstrated that reparations as defined are not racial discrimina-
tion in the ordinary legal sense. They neither impose the burdens of
public policy, nor confer its benefits, based on the race of the individual
receiving the burden or benefit in question.
Rawlsian legislators would operate under four key premises as they
contemplate reparations as defined. These are:
1) affirmative action and reparations as defined are distinct;
2) Rawlsian legislators have rejected affirmative action as
defined;
3) principles appropriate to the law of separate and free
transactions are distinct from those relevant to back-
ground justice; and
4) Rawls allows legislative race consciousness BUT ONLY
I submit that "disperse" and "widespread" are the key words here, referencing a
constant push of power outward away from the most powerful, in whose hands it naturally
concentrates, toward the least powerful. Daniels adds that "rather than supporting a "trickle
down" of gains from inequality, the difference principle mitigates the effects of the social
and natural lottery by requiring a maximal flow outward," Daniels, supra note 132, at 251.
As Madison noted in Federalist 48, we saw, "it will not be denied, that power is of an en-
croaching nature." James Madison, Federalist No. 48, in THE ESSErTIAL FEDERALIST AND
ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS 237 (David Wootton ed., Hackett Publishing, 2003). Accordingly,
he argued, institutions and practices must be established which regularly counteract this
tendency. Just as animal life requires the constant circulation of blood away from the heart
to the extremities, power must constantly be circulated away from the center to the pe-
riphery, to those communities with the least power and wealth. Public education is one
example of this, but reparations toward the communities to be identified in this Article are
a more specific, targeted means for doing so.
160. FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 64-65 (parenthetical and emphasis added).
161. THEoRY, supra note 17, at 17.
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a) along with other more basic considerations, like wealth
and income, which define least advantaged status under
the difference principle; and
b) where legislators act to preserve background justice.
In view of these premises, this Article argues that given their unique
combination of knowledge and ignorance, and tasked with translating the
difference and FEO principles into statutory law, Rawlsian legislators
would make ample provision for reparations as defined.
To begin, the veil has been lifted far enough to provide our legisla-
tors the knowledge to legislate competently. While they do not know
who they will be, it is clear that they have access to "the full range of gen-
eral economic and social facts."' 2 Accordingly, they have a general
understanding of the human condition and a sense of the array of advan-
tages and disadvantages into which humans are born. They know, for
example, that some people, through no fault of their own, are seriously
physically disabled. By definition, of course, our legislators have no direct
experience of being, for example, blind or wheelchair-bound.Yet the bur-
den such conditions impose, by contrast to that borne by the majority
lucky enough to take sight and mobility for granted, is plain for them to
see. Rawlsian legislators would thus rationally consider someone who is
both poor and seriously disabled to be among those we can fairly call the
truly least advantaged. Such a person is one of a minority in society who
bear the burden of not just one major disadvantageous social or natural
contingency, but two. Accordingly, our legislators would consider persons
who are both poor and seriously disabled to be among those whose dis-
advantage they are most urgently duty-bound to relieve under the
difference principle."" What would such relief consist of? In elucidating
the FEO principle, Rawls provides some guidance: "[m]edical care ....
falls under the general means necessary to underwrite fair equality of op-
portunity and our capacity to take advantage of our basic rights and
liberties, and thus to be normal and fully cooperating members of society
over a complete life."'' 4
Enabling everyone to "take advantage of (their) basic rights and lib-
erties and thus ... be normal and fully cooperating members of society
over a complete life" seems to be both a means and an end for Rawls.
162. Id. at 175. Shiffrin overlooks the four stage sequence and thus misleads when
she writes that "properly addressing specific issues about reparations and affirmative action
requires sensitivity to contemporary circumstances and historical facts. This requires access
to information that is unavailable behind the veil at the stage at which the theory ofjus-
tice is articulated." Shiffrin, supra note 67, at 1654.
163. [l]t seems impossible to avoid a certain arbitrariness in actually identifying the
least favored group .... Yet we are entitled at some point to plead practical considerations,
for sooner or later the capacity of philosophical or other arguments to make finer dis-
criminations must run out. I assume that the persons in the original position understand
these matters, and that they assess the difference principle in comparison with the other
alternatives accordingly. THEORY, supra note 17, at 84.
164. FAIRNEss, supra note 18, at 174.
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Insofar as it is an end with regard to the disabled poor, our legislators
would clearly provide means like wheelchair ramps and Braille signs,
where essential, in public spaces like subway stations, public libraries and
public universities.Yet they would not stop there. Since basic familiarity
with the human condition discloses that early structured intervention in
life is crucial, and since our legislators know that they may be channeling
resources that could make all the difference in their own lives, they would
also provide for adequate health care and special education for poor dis-
abled children. They would know that this would be necessary, if not
sufficient, for these children to become "normal and fully cooperating
members of society over a complete life," i.e., citizens with the motivation
and ability to be in places like libraries and universities.
Against this backdrop, and with a key shift in focus from the indi-
vidual to the community level that is appropriate for the domain of
background justice, our legislators would similarly view children in the
poorest of predominantly Black or Native American communities to be
among the truly least advantaged, and thus among the primary targets of
the difference principle.'"' No serious reader will interpret this statement
to equate race with disability. The point is that from the viewpoint of
Rawlsian legislators, knowledgeable about society yet still behind the veil
of ignorance, children in the communities identified are, like poor dis-
abled children, among the truly least advantaged. 66 This in turn yields a
powerful duty on these legislators, under the difference principle, in bal-
ance with other pressing obligations, to provide for these children as they
would provide for themselves.
To illustrate, while our legislators are not experts, they know the ba-
sic history of American race relations and race law. They are well aware of
broad current social and economic facts partly traceable to that history.
These include the highly disproportionate overlap between poverty and
race-more specifically, between poverty and 1) urban Black '7 and
165. In identifying these communities as primary targets of legislative reparations, this
Article does not assert that the least advantaged individuals-for example, those with seri-
ous physical disabilities-regardless of socioeconomic class or geographic community of
residence, would not also be targeted for assistance under the difference principle.
166. AsWeatherford notes, those who are "poor through no fault of their own ... are
... not just poor, but deserving poor." Weatherford, supra note 72, at 43 (emphasis omit-
ted).
167. As Lyons observes, "[ploverty in the United States is most concentrated in the
Black urban ghetto." Lyons, supra note 1, at 1395. As Robinson adds, "blacks are heavily
overrepresented among the ranks of American's desperately poor." ROBINSON, supra note
92, at 78-79. Loury refers to "the vast disparities in economic advantage which separate
the inner-city black poor from the rest of the nation" and "the historical experiences
which link ... the current urban underclass to our long, painful legacy of racial trauma."
Glenn C. Loury, Achieving the 'Dream': A Challenge to Liberals and Conservatives in the Spirit
of Martin Luther KingJr., in AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT 495,495-97 (Kenneth M. Dol-
beare & Michael S. Cummings eds., CQ Press, 2004) [hereinafter, Loury Il. See generally
Jack Greenberg, Affirnative Action in Higher Education: Confronting the Condition and Theory,
43 B.C. L. REV. 521, 563-64 (2002); William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A
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2) rural Native American' 6 communities. Just as they can see that there is
no less advantaged individual than someone both poor and disabled, they
would agree that there are no less advantaged commtnities than these ones.
They combine the densest poverty with a majority of persons in groups
that have been most oppressed in the U.S. based on race or ethnicity. ' ,
History, Critique, and Reconstnrction, 69 FORDiiAM L. REv. 1821, 1842-45 (2001) (the urban
Black underclass was the target of the 1964 Civil Rights Act); Lamb, supra note 137, at
167, and MacFarlane, supra note 137, at 317-18 (the urban Black underclass was also the
target of the Model Cities and Community Action Programs).
Although Conley speaks solely in terms of the comparative wealth of racial groups,
he underscores important race/class links that our legislators, focused on background jus-
tice, would take into account. See DALTON CONLEY, Wealth Matters, in REPARATIONS FOR
SLAVERY, supra note 22, at 290-98. In addition, although preferences for several groups are
routinely justified solely by reference to the situation of African-Americans, Conley's sole
focus on Blacks and Whites is no obstacle to reparations as defined, since the facts he cites
would be relevant for, and only for, reparations for impoverished Black communities.
McGary, recognizes that it is not Black communities, but rather poor Black com-
munities, toward which there is a compelling moral obligation. See McGARY, supra note
114, at 62-78.
168. Native Americans have the lowest per capita income among any ethnic group in
the country. As the American Indian Relief Council reports,
Approximately half of the nation's 2,500,000 Native Americans live on reser-
vations throughout the United States, "living in conditions that are four to
five decades behind the majority of Americans." "More than 40% of families
on the reservations live below the 1999 federal poverty line." The scarce
number of jobs available on reservations and lack of economic opportunity
fuel unemployment rates that often exceed 85%.
www.airc.org/livingconditions (citations omitted). As one commentator thus observes,
"Native people are the poorest of the poor, having the highest rates of unemployment,
cancer, infant mortality, accidental death, suicide, and homelessness in America." Matthew
Atkinson, Red Tape: How American Laws Ensnare Native American Lands, Resources, and People,
23 OKLA. Cry U.L. REv. 379, 420 (1998).
Those Native American communities with large casino revenues would, of course,
be an exception to this rule. Since they are not among the poorest communities, they are
not, under Rawls, among the least advantaged, and so would not be candidates for repara-
tions as defined.
169. To borrow an old, apt phrase, such communities would be among the most
"discrete and insular" of all. See U.S. v. Carolene Prods., 304 U.S. 144, 152-53, n.4 (1938).
As a matter of language, 'discrete' means separate or distinct and 'insular'
means isolated or detached.... Social commentators note that poor ...
people are often confined to inner city areas in which high concentrations of
poverty exist, which further isolates them from mainstream society. In addi-
tion, government policies have increased the physical isolation of the poor
over the past twenty years through tax abatements, exclusionary
zoning policies, and subsidies that confine poor people within an invisible
wall.
Jennifer E. Watson, WMen No Place is Home: K/h y the Hotneless Deserve Suspect Classification,
88 IOWA L. REv. 501,516-17 (2003) (citations omitted).
While the poor are among the least advantaged for purposes of the difference prin-
ciple, the Black middle and upper classes are not. While the latter are usually discrete, they
are not insular. For the reasons indicated, however, our legislators could rationally decide
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Our legislators would know the statistics on these communities, for ex-
ample, the chances of being born out of wedlock, receiving little formal
education, ending up in prison, or dying young. Moreover, one of the
major social contingencies Rawls considers in focusing on the basic struc-
ture is "good or ill fortune, or good or bad luck, over the course of life
.... This idea firmly links the idea of "least advantaged" with the
communities identified above.' 72 Quite simply, regardless of where fault
may lie for the social pathologies of these communities, self-interested
legislators behind the veil of ignorance would rationally regard it very
poor luck to be born into one of them, rather than, for example, born
into the Black middle class. Knowing that they neither can, nor are ex-
pected to, end human inequality, yet are duty-bound to preserve
that impoverished communities with a majority of Blacks or Native Americans must be
among the starting points for appropriations designed to carry the difference principle
into effect.
170. See, e.g., DEDRICK MUHAMMAD ET AL., TI-E STATE OF THE DREAM: ENDURING
DisPARTIES IN BLACK AND WHITE 4-9 (United for a Fair Economy Jan. 15 2004); LOURY,
supra note 117, at 175-204; Loury II, supra note 167, at 494, 496; Forde-Mazrui, supra note
89, at 705, 727-37; Nobles, Crawford, & Leary, Reparations and Health Care for African-
Americans, in WINBUSH, supra note 22, at 251-81.As Greenberg writes,
High concentrations of urban poverty are inextricably linked with a host of
social problems, which have come to characterize urban black America. The
odds of dropping out of high school and the odds of teenage birth rise in
lock step with the age of low status workers in a neighborhood. Douglas S.
Massey has written that poverty and racial concentration are "mutually rein-
forcing and cumulative, leading directly to the creation of underclass
communities typified by high rates of family disruption, welfare dependence,
crime, mortality and educational failure." Living in a poor neighborhood
increases the likelihood of pregnancy among black adolescent girls and low-
ers the age of first sexual intercourse. A 1993 study detected "reasonably
powerful neighborhood effects ... on childhood IQ, teenage births, and
school-leaving, even after the differences in the socioeconomic characteris-
tics of families are adjusted for.
Greenberg, supra note 167, at 565 (citations omitted).
171. FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 55.
172. Again, many nonminorities fare poorly with regard to the social contingencies.
This Article simply asserts that, subject to their detailed legislative findings, Rawlsian
agents could rationally and justly begin with the most impoverished Black and Native
American communities. Lines will have to be drawn, and Rawls would not require that
every impoverished community and every minority community can or should receive
reparations as defined. Legislators, however, must draw lines all the time. One could thus
imagine, for example, our legislators drawing one line at impoverished Hispanic conmu-
nities, not only because the American Hispanic population is so large and growing so
quickly, but also because the Spanish, like the English and unlike African-Americans and
Native Americans, are and were a European colonial power. Indeed, the Spanish on some
accounts treated Native Americans as brutally as did the English. See PETER NABOKOV,
NATIVE AMERICAN TESTIMONY:A CHRONICLE OF INDIAN-WHITE RELATIONS FROM PROPHECY
TO THE PRESENT 19 (Penguin Books 1992). It is thus perhaps Spain rather than the U.S.
that should pay reparations to impoverished Hispanic American communities.
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background intergenerational justice, our legislators would include such
communities among their starting points in this endeavor.'
7
-
The idea of luck brings us back, once again, to the FEO principle.
As Rawls writes,
[Flair equality of opportunity is said to require not merely that public of-
fices and social positions be open in the fonnal sense, but that all should
have a fair chance to attain them. To specify the idea of a fair chance we
say: supposing that there is a distribution of native endowments, those who
have the same level of talent and ability and the same willingness to use
these gifts should have the same prospects of success regardless of their so-
cial class of origin, the class into which they are born and develop until the
age of reason. In all parts of society there are to be roughly the same pros-
pects of culture and achievement for those similarly mlotivated and
endowed. '7
Assuming equal motivation and endowment, all are to have roughly
the same life prospects, regardless of social class of origin. If that is the
goal, however, what are the means for achieving it? Once again, "medical
care ... falls under the general means necessary to underwrite fair equality
of opportunity and our capacity to take advantage of our basic rights and
173. My conclusion is reinforced by an analogy Rawls uses to anchor the difference
principle:
The draft rule in a professional sport such as basketball ranks teams in the
opposite order from their standing in the league at the end of the season:
championship teams go last in the draft of new players.This rule provides for
regular and periodic changes in the roster of teams and is designed to ensure
that teams in the league are more or less evenly matched from year to year,
so that in any give season each team can give any other team a decent game.
These changes of players are necessary to achieve the aims and attractions of
the sport and not foreign to its purpose.
FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 51.
If we substitute conmunities for teams, the comnmunities identified in this Article
are like teams that finish a season with the lowest standing. As the least advantaged, the
difference principle puts them first in line for new resources, in order be the healthy, com-
petitive, productive units they would be with adequate resources. Again, programs like
those identified in this Article were tried with mixed success in the 1960s, yet this changes
neither whether they find support in Rawls nor whether they would do better with ade-
quate funding.
It night be thought that the draft analogy supports racial preferences and quotas,
but it does not.While the draft rule requires that weaker teams be given first chance at the
best players, those players have no legitimate long-term expectations upset by the draft
rule.They will all play in the big leagues,just not necessarily for the team they would have
chosen without the draft rule. In the affirmative action context, by contrast, it is clear that
not all universities (or jobs, even assuning everyone obtains one) are in the same league.
It would be a poor civic vision, of course, to see the various races as competing like
in a professional sports league. Rawls's draft analogy is introduced only for its support of
reparations as defined.
174. Id. at 43-44 (emphasis added).
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liberties, and thus to be normal and fully cooperating members of society
over a complete life."'
7
5
This brief passage sums up so much so well that little more is
needed to derive reparations as defined from the FEO principle. Adult
citizens must be in reasonably good physical and mental health to be free
to take advantage of the political liberties and FEO provided by the con-
stitution and civil rights laws.Yet humans are such, as our legislators know,
that the prerequisite for that necessary condition is the healthy upbring-
ing of children into adults capable of self- government. As Nagel observes,
The obligation of an affluent society to ensure access to education through
the university level to all who are willing and able to benefit from it and
some obligation to see that children receive adequate nourishment and
medical care, however poor their parents may be, are accepted by most
segments of the political spectrum in broadly liberal societies.""
Reparations as defined, targeted at the health' 77 and educational7"
needs of children in the communities identified above, thus go to the root
of what is essential to make FEO a reality.'79 They are necessary, if not
175. Id. at 174.
176. Nagel, supra note 69, at 69. As DuBois wrote at a time when Blacks in the U.S.
were completely segregated and mostly poor, "while it is a great truth to say that the Ne-
gro must strive and strive mightily to help himself, it is equally true that unless his striving
be not simply seconded, but rather aroused and encouraged, by the initiative of the richer
and wiser environing group, he cannot hope for great success." WE.B. DuBois, THE SOULS
OF BLACK FOLK 93-94 (Signet Classics 1994).
177. As Kopelman and Palumbo write, "a society committed to a fair equality of
opportunity for children should provide adequate health care.... Using the difference
principle-maximizing benefits for the worst off-free, additional service might be pro-
vided to the poorest children, so they could compete more effectively with those from
more affluent homes." Loretta M. Kopelman & Michael G. Palumbo, The US Health Care
Delivery System: Inefficient and Unfair to Children, 23 AM.J. L. & MED. 319,329-30 (1997).
178. As Rawls writes, "institutions must, from the outset, put in the hands of citizens
generally, and not only of a few, sufficient productive means for them to be fully cooperat-
ing members of society on a footing of equality. Among these means is human as well as
real capital, that is, knowledge and an understanding of institutions, educated abilities, and
trained skills." FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 140. "[Children's] education should ... prepare
them to be fully cooperating members of society and enable them to be self-supporting."
Id. at 156 (word added).
Reparations as defined would thus do exactly what Forde-Mazrui ultimately calls
for, at least in urban Black communities:
What is needed for black children and families are long-term opportunities
for self-development, opportunities to play, to learn, and to work in a cultural
environment that nourishes self-esteem. Society's responsibility is not so
much to give black people fish, but to teach them how to fish and to provide
meaningful access to American's main stream.
Forde-Mazrui, supra note 89, at 751. See also FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 148-50.
179. Speaking of roots, Rawls's further comments on medical care are illuminating:
"[Treatment that restores persons to good health, enabling them to resume their normal
lives as cooperating members of society, has great urgency-more exactly, the urgency
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sufficient, to enable the children in these communities to become normal,
cooperating members of society over a full life.. They are thus a just and
rational policy counterweight to strict enforcement of the nondiscrimina-
tion rule at the heart of civil rights laws. Given their unique combination
of knowledge and ignorance, and tasked with translating the difference
and FEO principles into legislation, Rawlsian legislators would support
reparations as defined.'"' Just as they would reject strong forms of affirma-
tive action because they do not know their racial membership, they would
specified by the principle of fair equality of opportunity; whereas cosmetic medicine, say, is
not offhand a need at all." FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 174.
This distinction between urgent care and "cosmetic medicine" suggests yet again
that affirmative action is inconsistent with fair equality of opportunity. Unlike reparations
as defined, preferences by UM law school for middle class and upper middle class minori-
ties do not go to the roots of the problems of the communities identified in this Article.
Indeed, even UM's socioeconomic preferences in the undergraduate admissions program
struck down in Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (2003), do not go to those roots. On this
account, quite beyond its treatment of the individual, affirmative action is a cosmetic rem-
edy compared to reparations as defined, and is thus inconsistent with Rawls's own account
of the FEO principle. Moreover, to the extent UM Law is not really interested in diversity
as articulated in Bakke, supra note 26, the diversity it does achieve is largely cosmetic. See
Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 393 (2003)(Kennedy, J. dissenting); Brian N. Lizotte, The
Diversity Rationale: Unprovable, Uticotnpelling, 11 MICH.J. RACE & L. 625 (2006).
180. I say necessary but not sufficient since legislators can provide the resources for a
poor disabled child to participate in society, yet they can ultimately do little for that child
if he grows up in a home that does not support and nourish him. In similar fashion, this
Article does not claim that public financial resources are sufficient for children in poor
Black or Native American communities to become normal, cooperating members of soci-
ety. A great deal will depend on the culture in these communities, a subject that prominent
minority figures, including the President, have spoken about for some time. See, e.g., Presi-
dent Barack Obama, Remarks by the President to the NAACP Centennial
ConventionJuly 17, 2009); BARACK OBAMA,THE AUDACITY OF HOPE 254-55 (Crown Pub-
lishers 2006); Loury I!, supra note 167, at 496-97, 500; JOHN MCWHORTER, WINNING THE
RACE: BEYOND THE CRISIS IN BLACK AMERICA 10-12, 376 (Gotham Books 2005); JUAN
WILLIAMS, ENOUGH:THE PHONY LEADERS, DEAD- END MOVEMENTS, AND CULTURE OF FAIL-
URE THAT ARE UNDERMINING BLACK AMERICA-AND WHAT WE CAN Do ABOUT IT (Crown
Publishers 2006).
181. At the very least, under liberal democratic principles and the full publicity con-
dition, Rawlsian legislators would allow Mr. Conyers to have his hearings and make his
recommendations. See FAIRNESS, supra note 18, at 121-22. After all, Rawls advocates "af-
firm[ingi the institutions of freedom of thought and liberty of conscience; for rational
inquiry and considered reflection tend over time, if anything does, to expose illusions and
delusions." Id. at 122. Moreover, just as they would conduct oversight to ensure strict en-
forcement of the nondiscrimination rule they have enacted into their civil rights laws,
Rawlsian legislators would carefully oversee the allocation of the reparations they have
appropriated. Finally, if reparations as defined were appropriated and then challenged un-
der the equal protection clause, they would survive that constitutional challenge. By
contrast to the governmental actions at issue in Grutter v. Bollitnger and Parents Involved in
Coinnunity &hools v. Seattle School District /Meredith v. Jefferson County Board of Education,
after all, reparations as defined treat no individual differently than he would otherwise be
treated based on race. It is thus difficult to see who would even have standing to bring
such a suit without reliance, for example, on the flimsy theory of taxpayer standing.
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support reparations as defined in this Article because they do not know
their community of origin.'"
With the grounds for this Article's full thesis in view, it appears con-
sistent with key comments by leading scholars as well as three
fundamental ideas in Rawls.
To begin with, given the effects of American racism, Daniels claims
that we are led to "a stronger principle" than that of "careers open to tal-
ents.''0 3 Yet he follows this with vague, noncommittal remarks about
public education. This includes a passing reference to "basic inequalities
between the best suburban schools, serving rich white children, and the
worst rural and urban schools, serving poor minority and white chil-
dren,""4 as well as the following: "[e]ven if we had more equitable public
schools, fair equality of opportunity might also require programs aimed at
early educational intervention for preschool children, like Head Start, or
comprehensive daycare programs of the sort that exist in some other
countries.'' " This passage points weakly toward reparations as defined, yet
Daniels does not follow the analysis through by applying Rawls's theory
to derive them.
Nagel, we saw, expressly rejects "affirmative action" as inconsistent
with Rawls.Yet he also writes that the "positive equality of opportunity"
which Justice as Fairness calls for "demands much more state action" than
the "careers open to talents" principle and the "absence of barriers to
competition" that characterize "negative equality of opportunity."'' ' This
is a fair interpretation, but the incompleteness of Nagel's argument clearly
emerges when he goes on to observe that people can disagree about the
"degree to which inequalities of opportunity ought to be evened out," i.e.,
about "how much has to be done.""117 The problem is that such language
casts the question of the remedial policies that flow from Rawls's theory
in the single dimension of degree of state action. By thus failing to recog-
nize distinctions of the kind of state action, Nagel does not seem to see
that Rawls may yield strong forms of reparations, even if not strong forms
of affirmative action.
182. This Article's thesis may be particularly strong in the aftermath of Parents In-
volved in Conmunity Schools v. Seattle School District and Meredith v.Jefferson County Board of
Education. If, as some have suggested, the public schools in predominantly Black urban
areas become increasingly racially concentrated as a result of these cases, then the commu-
nities that are appropriate for reparations as defined become even clearer.
Beyond this, while Goodman's attempt to derive race based college scholarships
from Rawls has many flaws, scholarships based on an individual's origin in one of the
identified communities, rather than his race, might flow from Rawls.
183. Daniels, supra note 132, at 250.
184. Id.
185. Id. (emphasis added).
186. Nagel, supra note 69, at 68-69 (emphases added).
187. Id. at 69 (emphases added).
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As for Loury, he opposed affirmative action in 1990 for resting on
the mistaken belief that Blacks cannot compete under White standards.
He also scolded the left for labeling anyone who questions affirmative
action's double standards as racist.'18 By 2002, however, he embraced race
preferences in university admissions.'"" There are two replies to this view-
point.
First, Loury suggests that racial equality must be a just society's
highest priority, yet he never reckons with R1awls's distinction between
race and least advantaged status. He thus fails to challenge this Article's
thesis, which not only incorporates this key aspect of Rawls's theory, but
allows, as Loury demands, for "public purposes [to be] formulated in racial
terms."")" It "take[s] account of race while trying to mitigate the effects of
this [racial] subordination,"' and is thus faithful to the distinction be-
tween race blindness and race indifference. As Loury writes,
Let us reserve the phrase "race-blind" to describe the practice of not using
race when carrying out a policy. And let us employ a different terni-
"race-indifferent"-to identify the practice of not thinking about race
when detemiining the goals and objectives on behalf of which some policy
is adopted.''
2
While Loury concedes that "worthy racial goals can sometimes be
effectively pursued with race-blind means"'' 19 3 he rejects race indifference.
He is on strong ground, yet this Article's thesis satisfies both strands of his
nuanced position. For reasons already considered above, Rawlsian legisla-
tors would enact race blindness into the law of separate and free
transactions between individuals and associations. Yet they would not be
indifferent to race, for reparations as defined in this Article take account of
race as a secondary factor in determining which communities will be
among the prime targets for resources under the difference principle.'"
4
Turning to Rawls, finally, the ideas of public reason,'"' overlapping
consensus,'19 and legitimate expectations"' mark important distinctions. As
for the first two, whatever the flaws in this Article's argument, it cannot be
dismissed as partisan rhetoric. I have grounded my case in principles
Rawls shows would be accepted by rational, unbiased persons behind the
188. See Loury II, supra note 167, at 501-02.
189. See LouRY, supra note 117, at 133-47.
190. Id. at 140.
191. Id. at 139.
192. Id. at 133.
193. Id. at 135.
194. On this account, we can now see that this Article's thesis also satisfies Rosen's
criteria, noted at the outset, of avoiding "the extremes of conservative colorblindness and
liberal racialism." Rosen, supra note 11.
195. See FAIRNEss, supra note 18, at 212-54.
196. See id. at 133-72.
197. See THEORY, supra note 17, at 273-77.
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veil of ignorance. Moreover, this thesis challenges both the political left
and right while yielding policies favored by both sides: the left secures
reparations as defined while the center and right secure strict enforcement
of racial nondiscrimination in most domains of state action. As in Rawls
generally, the concerns of the right and left receive their due, and some
measure of overlapping consensus is thereby achieved. Many members of
Congress would not find this thesis fully satisfactory."" Yet this is often
true of proposals that become federal law, especially if an intelligent,
popular President champions them.
Finally, it is legitimate expectations, in Rawls's view, and not moral
desert, that characterize a just distributive scheme under contract the-
ory."' Therefore, in the U.S. in 2010 a racial minority member who is not
raised in one of the communities I have identified cannot legitimately
expect a racial preference in university admissions or employment.21" An
honest look at his society, beginning with the race and words of his Presi-
dent, validates Rawls's claim that least advantaged status is no mere
function of a person's race. 2 ' At the same time, when he applies for uni-
versity admission or employment, he can legitiniately expect vigorous
enforcement of the racial nondiscrimination rule at the heart of the 1964
Civil Rights Act. Moreover, if he has been raised in one of the communi-
ties identified in this Article, he can legitimately expect that he will
receive the benefits of reparations as defined. 2- From his viewpoint as a
citizen in an imperfect world, he has reason to think that his society's in-
stitutions are basically just, and that they satisfy his legitimate
21)3
expectations.
198. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Frustration at Obaina's Nuanced Style on Race, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 9, 2010, at A14.
199. See THEORY, supra note 17, at 273-77.
200. Once again, we have recognized that arguments for the use of race, even in
separate and free transactions between individuals and associations, are stronger in domains
of public employment at the border of the Hobbesian state of nature, like law enforce-
ment, corrections, and the military.
201. With Obanma's election, it has been observed, "African-Americans have just
entered the no-excuses zone."Ta-Nehisi Coates, The Messiah Myth, TIME, Nov. 24, 2008, at
33 (quoting Jonetta Rose Barras). Commenting on Ricci, however, one editorial board
wrote that "Jilt has only been in recent years that little black and brown boys and girls
could routinely see firefighters who look like them and aspire to grow up to be a fire-
fighter, too." Editorial, Court Tirns a Blind Eye, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER,June 30, 2009, at
A10. In an era when those children see a Black President, the idea that they will assume
they cannot be firefighters seems implausible.
202. Moreover, although reparations as defined would not be given, for example, to
niddle class Black communities or impoverished White communities, suggestions like
Kahlenberg's for race-neutral socioecononic integration can fill the gap. See Richard
Kahlenberg, Stay Classy, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 18, 2006, at 13.
203. Yet not only is being White a disadvantage when racial preferences for minori-
ties are used, but also minorities are not entitled to a preference based solely on race.
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CONCLUSION
As noted at the outset, President Obama understands that a healthy
social contract is essential to a society worth living in and passing on to
our children and grandchildren. He knows, with FDR, that the political
branches, and not just the courts, have a constitutional role in redefining
the terms of that contract for each generation. In light of Rawls and the
"teaching moment" that is the year of Sotomayor, Ricci, and the Gates
arrest, I submit that Obama would call on Congress to reaffirm the racial
nondiscrimination standard of the 1964 Civil Rights act and pledge that
his Justice Department welcomes Congressional oversight to ensure the
enforcement of that rule. At the same time, he would support Mr. Con-
yers's formation of a commission to examine and report on the justice
and feasibility, in balance with other priorities, of providing reparations as
defined. If the commission's recommendations were positive, the President
would call on Congress to appropriate those resources. With such actions,
Obama would "use his power in ways that make both parties equally un-
happy,"2 4 while challenging them, in the exercise of public reason, to
"rethink their positions, perhaps even moving us beyond the "racial
stalemate" he has spoken of previously.216 Above all, no one could plausibly
accuse the President of unprincipled partisanship.
Nozick, we saw, observed that political philosophers after Rawls
must either work within his theory or explain why they will not. Those
who disagree with this Article's thesis are thus invited to support their
position on the terrain of Rawls's theory or meet Nozick's challenge to
explain why they reject that theory. It may be replied that, even assuming
this thesis is sound as a matter of political theory, our current economic
reality is such that it would be virtually impossible for Congress and the
President to find the resources, presumably billions of dollars, for repara-
tions, as they are defined in this Article. However, this is not necessarily so,
for two reasons.
First, Rawls is clear that in a world of scarcity, provisions for the least
advantaged under the difference principle are always to be made in bal-
ance with other priorities.27 Second, and more importantly, Rawlsian
legislators would think creatively about ways to generate the resources
fairly required by the difference principle, especially during an economic
crisis. They would note, for example, not only that the U.S. drug war has
204. Nancy Gibbs,'This is Our Time', TME, Nov. 17, 2008, at 40.
205. Stephen L. Carter, Affirmative Distraction, N.Y.TiMES,July 6, 2008, at 010.
206. Since poor urban Black communities are among the prime targets of reparations
as defined in this Article, such reparations would go a long way toward meeting legitimate
concerns of the Congressional Black Caucus. See William Douglas, As Black Joblessness
Soars, Caucus Nudges White House to Act, S.E CHRONICLE, Dec. 10, 2009, at A16.
207. See, e.g., THEORY, supra note 17, at 251-58, for Lawls's discussion of the just sav-
ings principle.
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been critiqued from across the political spectrum for decades, ' but also
that support for this war, especially marijuana prohibition, has fallen
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356-66 (Cambridge Univ. Press 2001); JOEL MI.LER, BAD TRIP: How THE WAR AGAINST
DRUGS IS DESTROYING AMERICA (WND Books 2004); JEFFREY A. MIRON, DRUG WAR
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dramatically in the past year.2 1 ) In California, for example, 56% of respon-
dents now favor ending marijuana prohibition, allowing the state to create
a monopoly on its sales and taxation.-' Beyond this, a report by Harvard
economist Jeffrey Miron, signed by over 500 economists, including three
Nobel laureates, concluded that if Congress allowed states to change from
prohibition to regulation of marijuana, it would save $15 billion a year.211
In light of this data and public reason, Rawlsian legislators could scarcely
deny that in the U.S. in 2010 such resources would be much better spent
on reparations as defined here than on marijuana prohibition.2 2 Given the
pace of change in state marijuana law, it would be best for the President
to call for serious reform sooner rather than later. Yet there is evidence,
even in California,23 that the national political climate is still such that he
cannot rationally do so if he seeks reelection to a second term (and it is
hard to imagine that he does not).The need for reparations as defined in
this Article, however, as well as rational drug law reform, will only be-
come more urgent with time. If Obama is reelected, these issues should
be at the top of the agenda in his next term.
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